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Abstract
GAZI ISHAK KARA: Essays on International Financial Regulation.
(Under the direction of Anusha Chari.)
The first chapter of this dissertation examines the incentives of national regulators to co-
ordinate regulatory policies in the presence of systemic risk in global financial markets. In
a two-country and three-period model, correlated asset fire sales by banks generate systemic
risk across national financial markets. Relaxing regulatory standards in one country increases
both the cost and the severity of crises for both countries in this framework. In the absence of
coordination independent regulators choose inefficiently low level of macro-prudential regula-
tion. A central regulator internalizes the systemic risk and thereby can improve the welfare of
coordinating countries. Symmetric countries always benefit from coordination. Asymmetric
countries choose different levels of macro-prudential regulation when they act independently.
Common central regulation will voluntarily emerge only between sufficiently similar countries.
The second chapter investigates the empirical determinants of cross country and over time
variation in the stringency of bank capital regulations. Despite the extensive attention that
the Basel capital adequacy standards received internationally, there exists significant variation
in the implementation of these standards across countries. Furthermore, a significant number
of countries increase or decrease the stringency of capital regulations over time. The chapter
investigates the empirical determinants of the variation that is seen in the data based on the
theories of bank capital regulation. The results provide strong evidence that countries with
high average returns to investment choose less stringent capital regulation standards. There
is also some evidence that capital regulations are less stringent in countries with higher ratio
of government ownership of banks where government ownership is used as a proxy for the
regulatory capture: the degree to which regulators are captured by the financial institutions
under their control. The results provide somewhat weaker evidence that countries with more
concentrated banking sectors impose less strict capital regulation standards.
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Chapter 1
Systemic Risk, International Regulation, and the Limits of Coordination
1.1 Introduction
The underlying shocks that precipitated the financial crisis of 2007-2009 quickly spread across
global financial markets and were amplified at an unprecedented scale. The strikingly global
nature of the crisis has revived interest in the international coordination of financial regulation.
Regulatory reforms and the strengthening of coordination between national financial regula-
tors are prominent items on the international reform agenda. The Financial Stability Board
(FSB) was set up by the G-20 countries during the crisis to create guidelines for regulatory
coordination and the supervision of systemic risk in the international financial system.1
This paper analyzes the incentives of national regulators towards international cooperation
when there is systemic risk in global financial markets using a game-theoretic model. In the
model, systemic risk in financial markets is generated through asset fire-sales. The model shows
that in the absence of cooperation, independent regulators choose inefficiently low regulatory
standards compared to regulation levels that would be chosen by a central regulator. A central
regulator internalizes systemic risk and improves welfare in cooperating countries. The model
also demonstrates that a common central regulation will voluntarily emerge only between
sufficiently similar countries.
Key features of a third generation of bank regulation principles, popularly known as Basel
III, strengthen capital regulations and add new elements to Basel bank regulation principles
1The Financial Stability Board (FSB) was established after the 2009 G-20 London summit in April 2009;
it is the successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). The FSF was founded in 1999 by the G-7 finance
ministers and central bank governors.
such as liquidity and leverage ratio requirements. With Basel III, the objective of regulation
aimed at creating a level playing field for internationally active banks is supported by an
objective of creating sound regulatory practices that will contain systemic risk in national and
international financial markets, and prevent pro-cyclical amplification of these risks over time.
In this paper, I revisit the issue of coordinating international financial regulation in the light
of recent developments in the international regulatory infrastructure. Acharya (2003, 2009) and
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) are notable studies in the literature on international financial
regulation. All three of these studies focus on the level playing field objective of financial
regulation, and examine the benefits to international coordination of financial regulation under
externalities that operate through the competition in loan markets.
The paper diverges from the previous literature by focusing on systemic externalities across
financial markets generated by fire-sales of assets. I examine the effects of systemic externali-
ties on the nature of international financial regulation in the absence of cooperation between
regulators, as well as its effects on the incentives of national regulators towards cooperation.
The paper also makes a contribution to the literature by studying the effects of structural
differences across countries on the choice of regulatory standards when countries are linked
through systemic externalities in international financial markets. I show herein that common
central regulation voluntarily emerges only between sufficiently similar countries.
During times of distress, asset prices can move away from the fundamental values and assets
can be traded at fire-sale prices. When firms or financial intermediaries face liquidity shocks,
and debt-overhang, collateral or commitment problems prevent them from borrowing or issuing
new equity; as a result they may have to sell assets to generate the required resources. If the
shocks are wide-spread throughout an industry or an economy, then potentially deep-pocket
outsiders will emerge as the buyers of the assets. However, some assets are industry specific,
and when they are redeployed by outsiders, they will be less productive. Industry-specific
assets will be sold to outsiders at a discount. This idea finds its origins in Williamson (1988)
and Shleifer and Vishny (1992), and later employed by fire-sales models such as Lorenzoni
(2008), Gai et al. (2008), Acharya et al. (2010) and Korinek (2011).
Industry-specific assets can be physical, or they can be portfolios of financial intermediaries
because many of these contain exotic tailor-made financial assets (Gai et al., 2008). The asset
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specificity idea is captured in this paper through a decreasing returns to scale technology
for outsiders, similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Lorenzoni (2008), Gai et al. (2008) and
Korinek (2011). Decreasing returns to technology for outsiders make the situation even worse
for distressed intermediaries because they have to accept higher discounts to sell more assets.
Empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that fire-sales of physical as well as financial assets
exist.2
The discussion above suggests that when numerous intermediaries concurrently face the
same type of shocks and sell assets simultaneously, asset prices can fall, forcing them to sell
additional assets. An individual intermediary takes the market price as given and decides how
much of its assets to sell to continue operating at an optimal scale. Therefore, each intermediary
neglects the negative externality of its asset sales on others. In a financially integrated world,
intermediaries from different countries sell assets in a global market to potentially the same set
of buyers. Therefore, initial shocks that hit individual countries can be amplified in globally
integrated financial markets, and this is the systemic externality considered in this paper.
I seek answers to the following questions: How do national regulators behave under this
systemic externality if they act non-cooperatively? Would an individual regulator tighten or
relax regulation when regulation is tightened in another country? Would national regulators
relinquish their authority to a central international regulator who would impose the same
set of regulatory standards across countries? How do asymmetries across countries affect the
nature of regulatory standards and the incentives of national regulators towards international
cooperation?
Briefly, I propose a three-period, two-good model that features two countries with inde-
pendent regulators. In each country there is a continuum of banks. Banks are protected by
limited liability, and there is deposit insurance in each country. Banks borrow consumption
goods from local deposit markets and invest in a productive asset in the first period.
2 Using a large sample of commercial aircraft transactions, Pulvino (2002) shows that distressed airlines sell
aircraft at a 14 percent discount from the average market price. This discount exists when the airline industry
is depressed but not when it is booming. Coval and Stafford (2007) show that fire-sales exists in equity markets
when mutual funds engage in sales of similar stocks. Fire-sales have been shown to exist in international settings
as well. A surge in foreign direct investment into emerging markets was recorded during Asia and Latin America
financial crises. In particular, Krugman (2000), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), and Acharya et al. (2010) show
that asset sales to outsiders during these crises were associated with high discounts, and many foreigners flipped
the assets they purchased during crises to domestics once the crises abated at very high returns.
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All uncertainty is resolved in the model at the beginning of the second period and one of
the two states of the world is realized: a good or a bad state. In the good state there are no
shocks and banks’ investments produce net positive returns in the last period. However, in
the bad state, banks’ investments are distressed and they have to be restructured to produce
the normal positive returns that are obtained in good times.
A continuum of global investors with large resources in the second period can purchase
productive assets in the second period to produce consumption goods in the third and final
period. Assets in different countries are perfect substitutes for global investors. However,
global investors are not as productive as the domestic banks in operating domestic assets and
face decreasing returns to scale from these assets.
I solve the equilibrium of this model by backwards induction. Following the shocks in the
interim period, banks need to sell some fraction of their assets in a global capital market to
pay for the restructuring costs. An asset sale in the bad state is unavoidable because other
domestic resources required to carry out the restructuring process are unavailable. The price
of the productive asset is determined in a competitive market in which banks from the two
countries and global investors meet.
I show that a higher initial investment by banks in any of these countries will lead to a
lower price for the productive asset in this market. If the asset price falls below a minimum
threshold, return to the assets that can be retained by the banks is lower than the value of
the initial investment, and the banks become insolvent. Once it is known that banks are
insolvent, the deposit insurance fund requires bank owners to manage the productive assets
to realize the returns in the last period, then liquidates bank assets and makes the payments
that banks have promised to depositors. In this case the deposit insurance fund faces a deficit.
In the presence of deposit insurance, depositors in the model are passive and always deposit
their money with the bank. If the bank fails, the deposit insurance fund makes the necessary
payments to depositors.
Regulation in this model can be interpreted as setting the maximum leverage ratio. Each
regulator determines the initial regulatory standard by taking into account the equilibrium in
the asset market in the interim period. Due to limited liability, banks always leverage up to the
maximum by borrowing funds from the local deposit market. In other words, the maximum
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leverage ratio always binds. Therefore, the initial investment level of banks in a given country
is determined completely by the regulatory standard.
In the first period, regulators act simultaneously and choose the regulatory standard for
their domestic banks by taking the regulatory standard in the other country as given. I show
that when the countries are symmetric, there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of
the game between the two regulators. Moreover, regulation levels in the two countries are
strategic substitutes: if one regulator tightens the regulatory standard in its jurisdiction, the
other regulator optimally loosens its regulatory standard. The intuition behind this result is as
follows: When the first country reduces the maximum leverage level (i.e., tightens regulatory
standards), the extent of the fire-sale of assets in the bad state by banks in that country are
reduced, and a higher price is realized for the assets sold by these banks. This increases the
expected returns in the bad state, which allows the regulator in the other country to relax
regulation levels.
I show that, due to this systemic risk, regulatory standards in equilibrium when regulators
act non-cooperatively will be inefficiently lax compared to regulatory standards that would
be chosen by a central regulator. A central regulator aims to maximize the total welfare of
the two countries, and internalizes these externalities. I assume that, for political reasons,
the central regulator has to choose the same regulation levels in both countries. If the two
countries are symmetric, I show that forming a regulatory union will increase welfare in both.
Therefore, it is incentive compatible for the independent regulators of symmetric countries to
relinquish their authority to a central regulator.
I also consider the incentives of regulators when there are asymmetries between countries. I
focus on the asymmetries in the asset returns. In particular, I assume that banks in one coun-
try are uniformly more productive than the banks in the other country in terms of managing
the long-term asset. I show that cooperation would voluntarily emerge only between suffi-
ciently similar countries. In particular, the regulator in the high return country chooses lower
regulatory standards in equilibrium and is less willing to compromise on stricter regulatory
standards.
Interest in the international coordination of financial regulation is not an entirely recent
phenomenon. Arguments in favor of coordination and harmonization of regulatory policies
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across countries were made in the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I) which focused on credit risk
and set minimum capital requirements for internationally active banks and was enforced in
the G-10 countries in 1992.3
However, Basel I did not create an entirely level playing field for internationally active
banks because countries retained a significant degree of discretion about different dimensions
of regulation. Furthermore rapid developments in financial markets, especially increasingly
complex financial products brought about by financial innovation created significant differences
about the stringency of capital regulations across countries in practice (Barth et al., 2008).
These developments created a challenge for regulators and paved the way for Basel II.4
While progress on the implementation of Basel II was slower than expected, the global
financial crisis renewed urgency about increased cooperation and the better regulation of in-
ternational financial markets, in part because insufficient policy coordination between countries
and deficiencies in Basel II regulatory mechanisms were blamed for the severe contagion of the
crisis. Most of the international regulatory mechanisms proposed prior to the crisis had em-
phasized the soundness of financial institutions individually (micro-prudential regulation), but
had neglected regulatory standards that could enhance the stability of the financial system
as a whole by considering systemic risks (macro-prudential regulation). The model in this
paper focuses on macro-prudential regulation in the context of regulating systemic risk in the
international banking system.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a brief summary of related literature.
Section 3 provides the basics of the model and presents the main results of the paper without
resorting to a particular functional form. International financial regulation between asymmet-
ric countries is considered in Section 4. Section 5 shows the set of parameter ranges for which
systemic failures occur in the uncoordinated equilibrium when countries are symmetric. Sec-
tion 6 investigates the robustness of the results obtained from the basic model to some changes
3The intent of Basel I was to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system,
and diminish competitive inequality among international banks by creating a level playing field (Basel 1988).
4Basel I was updated in 2004 with more sophisticated sets of rules and principles for capital regulation that
intended to accommodate the developments in global financial markets. A survey done by Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) in 2006 showed that 95 countries (comprising 13 BSBC member countries plus 82 non-BSBC
jurisdictions) were planning to implement Basel II by 2015.
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in the model environment. Conclusions are presented in Section 7. All proofs are provided in
Appendix A.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper belongs to the international financial regulation theory that has developed in recent
decades. This paper is closest to Acharya (2003), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), Acharya
(2009), and Bengui (2011). In particular, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) investigate the
incentives of national regulators to form a regulatory union in a two-country banking model,
where a single bank from each country competes for loans in both markets in a Bertrand
differentiated products setup. Therefore, if one of the banks is allowed to expand its balance
sheet, low average returns to bank loans will be realized in both markets. Banks in this model
are also endowed with a costly monitoring technology. Low average returns reduce incentives
of banks to monitor, and hence undermines their stability. The authors show that, under
this externality, independent national regulators will implement lower capital requirements
compared to capital requirements that would be implemented by a central regulator. They also
show that symmetric countries always gain from cooperation, whereas a cooperation emerges
voluntarily only between sufficiently similar asymmetric countries. The coordination problem
for asymmetric countries as presented in this paper is similar to Dell’Ariccia and Marquez
(2006). However, in that model the asymmetry between countries was due to differences in
regulators’ exogenously specified tastes and preferences. In this paper I consider asymmetries
that are due to structural differences across countries, such as differences in asset returns.
Acharya (2003) shows that convergence in international capital adequacy standards cannot
be effective unless it is accompanied by convergence in other aspects of banking regulation,
such as closure policies. Externalities in his model are in the form of cost of investment in
the risky asset. He assumes that a bank in one country increases costs of investment for itself
and for a bank in the other country as it invest more in the risky asset and thereby creates
externalities for the bank in the neighboring country.
In the model considered by Acharya (2009), failure of a bank creates both negative and
positive externalities for surviving banks. Negative externality is the increase in the cost
of the deposits for surviving banks through a reduction in overall available funds. Positive
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externalities are strategic benefits that arise either through depositor migration from the failing
banks to surviving banks, or through acquisition of the failed banks’ assets and businesses by
surviving banks. He shows that that if the negative externality dominates positive externalities,
banks in different regions will choose their investments to be highly correlated compared to
globally optimal correlation levels. Acharya calls this fact “a systemic risk shifting”.
This paper also differs from previously mentioned studies in terms of its source for the
externalities between national financial markets. I focus on externalities between national
financial markets that operate through asset markets and asset prices whereas the studies
cited above considered externalities that operate through costs in the loan or deposit markets.
In this paper, systemic risk in international financial markets arises as banks from two countries
experience correlated liquidity shocks, and financial amplification effects are triggered due to
fire-sales. In that regard, this paper is closest to Bengui (2011), but mainly differs from
Bengui (2011) by considering the coordination problem under systemic risk for structurally
different countries. On the other hand, Bengui (2011) considers the coordination problem
for symmetric countries with risk averse individuals and imperfectly correlated shocks across
countries. As this paper affirms, provision of macro-prudential regulation is insufficient when
countries act independently, and regulatory standards are strategic substitutes across countries.
He also shows that risk taking could be higher in nationally regulated economies compared
to the competitive equilibrium, and that starting from a competitive equilibrium unilateral
introduction of a (small) regulation could be welfare reducing for the country introducing the
regulation.
Another branch of this literature considers regulation of a multi-national bank that operates
across two countries. Two notable studies, Dalen and Olsen (2003) and Holthausen and Rønde
(2004), focus on the tension between home and host country regulation of a multi-national
bank where informational asymmetries are the driving force of regulatory competition. Unlike
these studies, my paper focuses on a model in which banks invest in a single country and are
therefore regulated only by their home country, but interact with each other in global asset
markets. The tension between regulators in my model arises from the externalities that banks
in different countries create for each other in global asset markets during times of distress.
This study can also be viewed as a part of the broader literature on macroeconomic policy
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coordination that was especially active especially from late 1970s through the 1990s. Cooper
(1985) and Persson and Tabellini (1995) provide extensive reviews of this literature. Hamada
(1974, 1976) are the pioneer studies in the application of the game-theoretic approach to
strategic interactions among national governments.
Last, this paper is also related to the literature that features asset fire-sales. The common
theme across these studies is that, under certain conditions, asset prices can move away from
the fundamental values and assets can be traded in markets at fire-sale prices. One reason
for fire-sales is the combined effect of asset-specificity and correlated shocks that hit an entire
industry or economy. Origins of this idea can be found in Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) which claim that fire-sales are more likely when major players in an industry face
correlated shocks and the assets of the indusry are not easily redeployable in other industries.
In such a scenario a firm needs to sell assets to restructure and continue operations at a smaller
scale; however it cannot sell its assets at full value because other firms in the same industry
are experiencing similar problems. Outside investors would buy and manage these assets but
they are not as sophisticated as the firms in the industry. Therefore, they would be willing
to pay less than the full value of the assets to the distressed firms. Moreover, unsophisticated
investors may face decreasing returns in the amounts of assets they employ. This possibility
makes the situation even worse for distressed firms because if many of them try to sell assets
to outside investors simultaneously, they will have to accept higher discounts.
The closest papers in this literature to mine are Lorenzoni (2008), Gai et al. (2008) and
Korinek (2011) which essentially address the same question: how do privately optimal bor-
rowing and investment levels of financial intermediaries compare to the socially optimal levels
under pecuniary externalities in financial markets generated through asset fire-sales? In these
studies, the reason for fire-sales are limited commitment on financial contracts and the fact
that asset prices are determined in a spot market. Lorenzoni (2008) and Gai et al. (2008)
consider a single country, three-period model with a continuum of banks. Banks borrow from
consumers and offer them state-contingent contracts. In the interim period, banks are hit
by shocks and need to sell assets in some states to restructure distressed investments. These
papers show that there exists over-borrowing and hence over-investment in the risky asset in
a competitive setting compared to the socially optimal solution. Because in the competitive
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setting each bank treats the market price of assets as given when it makes borrowing and
investment decisions in the initial period, it does not internalize the externalities created for
other banks through fire sales. The planner considers the fact that a higher investment will
translate into lower prices for capital sold by banks during the times of distress. The main
difference between my paper and these papers is that they focus on issues in single country
cases to the exclusion of issues related to the international dimension of regulation.
Asset specificity is not the only reason for fire-sales. In Allen and Gale (1994, 1998) and
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) the reason for fire-sales is the limited available amount of
cash in the market to buy long-term assets offered for sale by agents who need liquid resources
immediately. The scarcity of liquid resources leads to necessary discounts in asset prices, a
phenomenon known as “cash-in-the-market pricing”.
1.3 Model
There are three periods, t = 0, 1, 2; and two countries, i = A,B. In each country there is
a continuum of banks and a continuum of consumers each with a unit mass and a financial
regulator. There is also a unit mass of global investors. All agents are risk-neutral.
There are two goods in this economy: a consumption good and a capital good (i.e., the
liquid and illiquid assets). Consumers are endowed with e units of consumption goods at t = 0,
and none at later periods.5
Banks have a technology that converts consumption goods into capital goods one-to-one at
t = 0. Capital goods that are managed by a bank until the last period yield R > 1 consumption
goods per unit. Consumption goods are perishable, and the capital fully depreciates at t = 2.
Capital goods can never be converted into consumption goods.6
Banks in each country i = A,B choose the level of investment, ni, in the capital good at
5I assume that the initial endowment of consumers is sufficiently large, and it is not a binding constraint in
equilibrium.
6I focus on a simple, tractable model where there is no safe asset and the liquidity shock at the interim
period has a degenerate distribution. I conjecture that relaxing the assumption of no safe asset will not change
the qualitative results of this model. If we allow banks to hoard safe asset, and consider a more general
distribution of liquidity shocks, banks will hold some optimum amount of safe asset at the initial period for
precautionary reasons. This precautionary savings, however, will not be sufficient to cover liquidity needs
under large realizations of shocks. In these states of the world, asset fire-sales will be unavoidable, and that
inevitability will generate the externality between countries that is the crucial part of the current model.
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t = 0, and borrow the necessary funds from domestic consumers. I consider deposit contracts
that are in the form of simple debt contracts, and assume that there is a deposit insurance fund
operated by the regulator in each country. Therefore banks can raise deposits from consumers
at a constant and zero net interest rate. I also assume that banks are protected by limited
liability.7
All uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of t = 1: a country lands in good times with
probability q, and in bad times with probability 1−q. In order to simplify the analysis, I assume
that the states of the world at t = 1 are perfectly correlated across countries. In good times
no banks are hit with shocks, therefore no further actions are taken. Banks keep managing
their capital goods, and realize the full returns from their investment, Rni, in the last period.
They make the promised payment, ni, to consumers, and hence earn a net profit of (R− 1)ni.
However, in bad times, the investments of all banks in both countries are distressed. In case of
distress, the investment has to be restructured in order to remain productive. Restructuring
costs are equal to c ≤ 1 units of consumption goods per unit of capital. If c is not paid, capital
is scrapped (i.e., it fully depreciates).
There are no available domestic resources (consumption goods) with which to carry out the
restructuring of distressed investment at t = 1. Only global investors are endowed with liquid
resources at this point. Due to a commitment problem, banks cannot borrow the required
resources from global investors. In particular, I assume that individual banks cannot commit
to pay their production to global investors in the last period.8 The only way for banks to raise
necessary funds for restructuring is to sell some fraction of the investment to global investors
in an exchange of consumption goods.
These capital sales by banks will carry the features of a fire-sale: the capital good will be
traded below its fundamental value for banks, and the price will decrease as banks try to sell
more capital. Banks in each country will retain only a fraction of their assets after fire-sales. If
7Limited liability and deposit insurance assumptions are imposed to match reality and to simplify the analysis
of the model. All qualitative results carry on when these assumptions are removed as shown is Section 6.
8For simplicity, I assume that the commitment problem is extreme (i.e., banks cannot commit to pay any
fraction of their production to global investors). Assuming a milder but sufficiently strong commitment problem
where banks can commit a small fraction of their production, as in Lorenzoni (2008) and Gai et al. (2008), does
not change the qualitative results of this paper.
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the asset price falls below a threshold, the expected return on the assets that can be retained
by banks will be lower than the value of the initial investment; hence, banks will become
insolvent.9 I call this situation a “systemic failure”.
Figure 1.1: Timing of the Model
Once it is known that banks are insolvent, deposit insurance requires the bank owners to
manage their capital goods to realize the returns in the last period. The regulator then seizes
banks’ returns, and makes the promised payments to depositors. The deposit insurance fund
runs a deficit. If fire-sales are sufficiently mild, however, then banks will have enough assets
to make the promised payments to the depositors. In this case banks remain solvent, but
compared to good times they make smaller profits. This sequence of events is illustrated in
Figure 1.1.
Banks are subject to regulation in the form of an upper limit on initial investment levels.10
Regulatory standards are set, independently, by the individual national regulators at the be-
ginning of t = 0. The regulator of country i determines the maximum investment allowed for
banks in its jurisdiction, Ni, while taking into account the regulation in the other country,
Nj , as given. Investment levels of banks in country i, have to satisfy ni ≤ Ni at t = 0. The
regulatory standard in a country is chosen to maximize the net expected returns on risky
investments.
9Because all uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of t = 1, the expected return to capital retained by
banks after fire sales, which is certain at that point, is R units of consumption goods per unit of capital.
10This regulation becomes equivalent to a minimum capital ratio requirement when we introduce a costly
bank equity capital to the model as shown in Section 1.6. I abstract from costly equity capital in the basic
model in order to simplify the exposition.
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1.3.1 Global Investors
Global investors are endowed with unlimited resources of consumption goods at t = 1.11 They
can purchase capital, y, from banks in each country at t = 1 and employ this capital to produce
F (y) units of consumption goods at t = 2. For global investors capital supplied by the banks
in these two countries are identical. Let P denote the market price of the capital good at
t = 1.12 Because we have a continuum of global investors, each investor treats the market
price as given, and chooses the amount of capital to purchase, y, to maximize net returns from
investment at t = 2
max
y≥0
F (y)− Py (1.1)
The amount of assets they optimally buy satisfies the following first order conditions
F ′(y) = P (1.2)
The first order condition above determines global investors’ (inverse) demand function for the
capital good. Using this, we can define their demand function D(P ) as follows
y = F ′(P )−1 ≡ D(P ) (1.3)
We need to impose some structure on the return function of global investors and the model
parameters in order to ensure that the equilibrium of this model is well-behaved.
1.3.2 Basic Assumptions
Assumption 1 (CONCAVITY).
F ′(y) > 0 and F ′′(y) < 0 for all y ≥ 0, with F ′(0) ≤ R.
11The assumption that there are some global investors with unlimited resources at the interim period when
no one else has resources can be justified with reference to the empirical facts during the Asian and Latin
American financial crises. Krugman (2000), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), and Acharya et al. (2010) provide
evidence that, when those countries were hit by shocks and their assets were distressed, some outside investors
with large liquid resources bought their assets.
12Price of capital at t = 0 will be one as long as there is positive investment, and the price of capital at t = 2
will be zero because capital fully depreciates at this point.
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Assumption CONCAVITY says that although global investors’ return is strictly increasing
the amount of capital employed (F ′(y) > 0), they face decreasing returns to scale in the
production of consumption goods (F ′′(y) < 0), as opposed to banks that are endowed with
a constant returns to scale technology as described above. F ′(0) ≤ R implies that global
investors are less productive than banks at each level of capital employed.
Concavity of the return function implies that the demand function of global investors
for capital goods is downward sloping (see Figure 1.2). Global investors will require higher
discounts to absorb more capital from distressed banks at t = 1 . This assumption intends
to capture that distress selling of assets is associated with reduced prices. Using a large
sample of commercial aircraft transactions Pulvino (2002) shows that distressed airlines sell
aircraft at a 14 percent discount from the average market price. This discount exists when
the airline industry is depressed but not when it is booming. Coval and Stafford (2007) show
that fire-sales exists in equity markets when mutual funds engage in sales of similar stocks.
Furthermore, Krugman (2000), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), and Acharya et al. (2010) provide
significant empirical and anecdotal evidence that during Asian and Latin American crises,
foreign acquisitions of troubled countries’ assets were very widely spread across industries,
and assets were sold at sharp discounts. These evidence suggests that foreign investors took
control of domestic enterprises mainly because they had liquid resources whereas the locals
did not, even though the locals had superior technology and know-how to run the domestic
enterprises. Further support for this argument comes from the evidence in Acharya et al.
(2010) that many foreigners eventually flipped the assets they acquired during the Asian crisis
to locals, and usually made enormous profits from such trades.
The idea that some assets are industry specific, and hence less productive in the hands of
outsiders has its origins in Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992). Examples of
industry-specific assets include oil rigs and refineries, aircraft, copper mines, pharmaceutical
patents, and steel plants. These studies have claimed that when major players in such indus-
tries face correlated liquidity shocks, and cannot raise external finance due to debt overhang,
agency or commitment problems, they may have to sell assets to outsiders. Outsiders are will-
ing to pay less than the value in best use for the assets of distressed enterprises because they
do not have the specific know-how to manage these assets well and therefore face agency costs
14
of hiring specialists to run these assets. The decreasing returns to scale technology assumption
captures the inefficiency of outsiders, similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Lorenzoni (2008),
Gai et al. (2008) and Korinek (2011).
Assumption 2 (ELASTICITY).
P,y = − ∂y
∂P
P
y
= − F
′(y)
yF ′′(y)
> 1 for all y ≥ 0
Assumption ELASTICITY says that global investors’ demand for the capital good is elas-
tic. This assumption implies that the amount spent by global investors on asset purchases,
Py = F ′(y)y, is strictly increasing in y. Therefore we can also write Assumption ELASTIC-
ITY as
F ′(y) + yF ′′(y) > 0
If this assumption was violated, multiple levels of asset sales would raise a given amount
of liquidity, and multiple equilibria in the asset market at t = 1 would be possible. This
assumption was imposed by Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2011) in order to rule out multiple
equilibria under fire-sales.13
Assumption 3 (REGULARITY).
F ′(y)F ′′′(y)− 2F ′′(y)2 ≤ 0 for all y ≥ 0
Assumption REGULARITY holds whenever the demand function of global investors is
log-concave, but it is weaker than log-concavity.14 In order to see this, let φ(y) ≡ F ′(y) denote
the (inverse) demand function of global investors. We can rewrite Assumption REGULARITY
as
φ(y)φ′′(y)− 2φ′(y)2 ≤ 0.
We can show that the demand function is log-concave if and only if φ(y)φ′′(y)−φ′(y)2 ≤ 0.
13Gai et al. (2008) provides the leading example where this assumption is not imposed and multiple equilibria
in the asset market is therefore considered.
14A function is said to be log-concave if the logarithm of the function is concave.
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Log-concavity of demand function is a common assumption used in the Cournot games lit-
erature (see Amir (1996)); it ensures the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a sim-
ple n-player Cournot game. Therefore, I call it a “regularity” assumption on F (·). Clearly
Assumption REGULARITY holds whenever the demand function is log-concave. However,
Assumption REGULARITY is weaker than log-concavity, and may also hold if the demand
function is log-convex (i.e., if φ(y)φ′′(y)− φ′(y)2 ≥ 0).
Assumption REGULARITY will ensure that the objective functions of regulators are well-
behaved. It will be crucial in showing that the equilibrium of this model exists and it is unique.
Many regular return functions satisfy conditions given by Assumptions CONCAVITY ,
ELASTICITY and REGULARITY . Here are two examples that satisfy all three of the above
assumptions:
Example 1 F (y) = R ln(1 + y)
Example 2 F (y) =
√
y + (1/2R)2
The following example satisfies Assumption CONCAVITY , but not Assumptions ELAS-
TICITY and REGULARITY .
Example 3 F (y) = y(R− 2αy) where 2αy < R for all y ≥ 0.
Assumption 4 (RANGE).
1 + (1− q)c < R ≤ 1/q
Assumption RANGE says that the return on investment for banks must not be too low
because otherwise equilibrium investment levels will be zero, and it must not be too high,
because otherwise equilibrium investment levels will be infinite. This assumption, while not
crucial for the results, allows us to focus on interesting cases in which equilibrium investment
levels are neither zero nor infinite.
1.3.3 Equilibrium with Symmetric Countries
In this section I consider only symmetric countries and solve the model by backwards induction.
First, I analyze the equilibrium at the interim period in each state of the world, for a given
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set of investment levels; then I solve the game between the regulators at t = 0. Note that, if
good times are realized t = 0, no further actions need to be taken by any agent. Therefore, at
t = 1 we need only to analyze the equilibrium of the model for bad times.
I solve the model without resorting to some particular functional form. The results of this
paper hold for any functional form that satisfy Assumptions CONCAVITY , ELASTICITY ,
and REGULARITY .
Crisis and Fire-Sales
Consider the problem of a bank in country i if bad times are realized at t = 1. The bank
reaches t = 1 with a level of investment equal to ni which was chosen at the initial period.
The investment is distressed, and must be restructured using liquid resources. The investment
will not produce any returns in the last period if it is not restructured.15 The bank cannot
raise external finance from global investors because it cannot commit to pay them in the last
period. Therefore, the only way for the bank to raise the funds necessary for restructuring
is to sell some fraction of the investment to global investors and use the proceeds to pay for
restructuring costs, whereby it can retain another fraction of the investment.
At the beginning of t = 1 in bad times, a bank in country i decides what fraction of capital
to restructure (χi), and what fraction of restructured capital to sell (1 − γi) to generate the
resources for restructuring. Note that γi will then represent the fraction of capital that a bank
keeps after fire-sales.16 Thus the bank takes the price of capital (P ) as given, and chooses χi
and γi to maximize total returns from that point on
max
0≤χi,γi≤1
pii = Rγiχini + P (1− γi)χini − cχini (1.4)
15For example, if the assets are physical, restructuring costs can be maintenance costs or working-capital
needs.
16Following Lorenzoni (2008) and Gai et al. (2008), I assume that banks have to restructure an asset before
selling it. Basically, this means that bank receive the asset price P from global investors, use a part, c, to
restructure the asset, and then deliver the restructured assets to global investors. Therefore banks will sell
assets only if P is greater than the restructuring cost, c. We could assume, without qualitatively changing our
results, that it is the responsibility of global investors to restructure the assets that they purchase. However,
the model is more easily solved using the current story.
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subject to the budget constraint
P (1− γi)χini − cχini ≥ 0 (1.5)
The first term in (1.4) is the (certain) total return that will be obtained from the unsold part
of the restructured assets, which are χini, in the last period. The second term is the revenue
raised by selling a fraction (1 − γi) of the restructured assets, which are χini, at the given
market price P . The last term, cχini, gives the total cost of restructuring. Budget constraint
(1.5) says that the revenues raised by selling capital must be greater than or equal to the
restructuring costs.
By Assumption CONCAVITY , the equilibrium price of capital must satisfy P ≤ F ′(0) ≤
R, otherwise global investors will not purchase any capital. Later on, I will show that in
equilibrium we must also have c < P. For the moment, we will assume that the equilibrium
price of assets satisfies
c < P ≤ R (1.6)
Now, consider the first order conditions of the maximization problem (1) while ignoring the
constraints
∂pii
∂χi
= [Rγi + P (1− γi)− c]ni (1.7)
∂pii
∂γi
= (R− P )χini (1.8)
From (1.8) it is obvious that pii is increasing in γi because P ≤ R by (1.6): when the price of
capital goods is lower than the return that banks can generate by keeping them, banks want to
retain a maximum amount. Choosing γi as high as possible implies that the budget constraint
will bind. Hence, from (1.5), we obtain that the fraction of capital goods retained by banks
after fire-sales is
γi = 1− c
P
(1.9)
The fraction banks retain after fire-sales (γi) is increasing in the price of the capital good (P ),
and decreasing in the cost of restructuring (c). From (1.9) we can also obtain the total capital
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supply of a bank in country i as
Si(P, ni) = (1− γi)ni = c
P
ni (1.10)
for c < P ≤ R. This supply curve is downward-sloping and convex, which is standard in the
fire-sales literature. A negative slope implies that if there is a decrease in the price of assets
banks have to sell more assets in order to generate the resources needed for restructuring. This
is because banks are selling a valuable investment at a price below the fair value for them due
to an exogenous pressure (e.g., paying for restructuring costs).
On the other hand, using (1.9) we can write the first order condition (1.7) as
∂pii
∂χi
= Rγini ≥ 0 (1.11)
Equation (1.11) shows that revenues are increasing in χi at t = 1. Therefore, banks will
optimally choose to restructure the full fraction of the investment (χi = 1). In other words,
scrapping of capital will never arise in equilibrium.
Note that if the capital price is greater than R, banks want to sell all the capital goods
they have because they can get at most R per unit by keeping and managing them. If the price
is lower than c, however, they will optimally scrap all of their capital (χi = 0). As discussed
above, prices above R and below c will never arise in equilibrium. The total asset supply curve
of banks from the two countries is plotted in Figure 1.2 for an initial total investment in the
two countries of N .
Equilibrium in the Capital Market at t=1
Equilibrium price of capital goods, P ∗, will be determined by the market clearing condition
E(P ∗, nA, nB) = D(P ∗)− S(P ∗, nA, nB) = 0 (1.12)
The condition above says that the excess demand in the capital market, denoted by E(P, nA, nB),
is equal to zero at the equilibrium price. D(P ) in Equation (1.12) is the demand function of
global investors which was obtained from the first order conditions of global investors’ problem
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium in the Capital Goods Market
as shown by (1.3). S(P, nA, nB) is the total supply of capital goods. We can obtain it as
S(P, nA, nB) =
c(nA + nB)
P
(1.13)
by adding the individual supply of banks in each country given by (1.10).
This equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1.2. Note that the equilibrium price of capital at
t = 1 will be a function of the initial investment level in the two countries. Therefore, from
the perspective of the initial period I denote the equilibrium price as P ∗(nA, nB).
How does a change in the initial investment level in one of the countries affect the price
of capital at t = 1? Lemma 1 shows that if investment into the risky asset in one country
increases at t = 0, a lower price for capital will be realized in the fire-sales state at t = 1.
Lemma 1. P ∗(ni, nj) is decreasing in ni for i = A,B and j 6= i under Assumptions CON-
CAVITY and ELASTICITY.
Lemma 1 implies that higher investment in the risky asset in one country (i.e., a higher ni)
increases the severity of the financial crisis for both countries by lowering the asset prices. This
effect is illustrated in Figure 1.3. Suppose that initial investment level in country A increases,
increasing the total investment in the two countries from N0 to N1. In this case, banks in
country A will have to sell more assets at each price, as can be seen from individual supply
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function given by (1.10). Graphically, the total supply curve will shift to the right, as shown
by the dotted-line supply curve in Figure 1.3, which will cause a decrease in the equilibrium
price of capital goods. Lower asset prices, by contrast, will induce more fire-sales by banks in
both countries in the bad state due to the downward-sloping supply curve. This additional
result is formalized in Lemma 2.
Figure 1.3: Capital Goods Market: Comparative Statics
Lemma 2. Equilibrium fraction of assets sold in each country, 1− γ∗(ni, nj), is increasing in
ni for i = A,B under Assumptions CONCAVITY and ELASTICITY.
Together lemmas 1 and 2 imply that a higher initial investment in the risky investment
in one country creates negative externalities for the other country by making financial crises
more severe (i.e., via lower asset prices according to Lemma 1) and more costly (i.e., more
fire-sales according to Lemma 2).
Banks’ Problem
Each bank in country i at t = 0 chooses the investment level, ni, to maximize expected profits
given by
max
0≤ni≤Ni
Πi(ni) = q(R− 1)ni + (1− q) max [Rγni − ni, 0] (1.14)
where γ is the equilibrium fraction of rescued assets by a bank in country i which is equal to
1− c/P as shown by (1.9). A bank borrows from the local deposit market at a constant zero
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interest and invests in the productive asset. With probability q both countries are in good
times, and hence the investment produces returns as expected Rni. Banks make the promised
payments to depositors, ni, leading to a net profit of (R − 1)ni. With probability 1 − q both
countries are in the bad state. Banks from the two countries face restructuring costs, and
hence are forced to fire-sale their assets. Since banks are price-takers in the capital market,
the fraction of capital that they can save from the fire-sales, γ = 1 − c/P , is exogenous to
them. In other words, because each bank is small compared to market size, it does not take
into account the effect of its investment choice at t = 0 on the equilibrium price (P ), and thus
on the fraction of assets retained after fire-sales in equilibrium (γ).
Banks undoubtedly earn net positive returns in the good state since q(R−1) > 0. Moreover,
due to the limited liability, they never receive negative profits in the bad state. Because banks
do not internalize the effect of their initial investment on the stability of the financial system
at t = 1, there is no counter-effect that offsets the positive returns on investment. Therefore,
a bank’s net expected return from risky investment at t = 0 is always positive, and a bank
always makes itself better off by investing more. Therefore, the regulatory upper limit on the
risky investment at t = 0 will bind (i.e., banks will choose ni = Ni at t = 0).
Fire-sales will be severe for some parameters and banks may become insolvent in equilib-
rium as analyzed in Section 5. I assume that when banks are insolvent after fire-sales they are
required by law to manage remaining assets until the last period and transfer asset returns to
the deposit insurance fund. This is a reasonable assumption because banks are the only sophis-
ticated agents in our model domestic economy that can manage those assets. Furthermore, in
practice, the dissolution process of insolvent banks usually does not happen immediately. It
is a time-consuming process because, for example, loans have to be called-off or sold to third
parties to make payments to debtors. This assumption also captures this time dimension of
the dissolution process.
Regulators’ Problem
Regulators of the two countries simultaneously determine the regulatory standards for the
banks in their own jurisdictions before banks make their borrowing and investment decisions
at t = 0. Regulation in each country i = A,B takes the form of an upper limit, Ni ≥ 0, on the
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investment level allowed for domestic banks. Banks in country i have to abide by the regulation
by choosing their investment levels as ni ≤ Ni. As they set the standards, regulators anticipate
that banks will choose initial investment levels that are as high as possible, and incorporate
this fact into their decision problem.
The objective of an independent national financial regulator is to maximize the net expected
social welfare of its own country. Social welfare is defined as the expected return to the risky
investment minus the cost of the initial investment. Therefore, regulator i chooses Ni ≥ 0, to
solve
max
Ni≥0
Wi(Ni, Nj) = max
Ni≥0
qRNi + (1− q)Rγ∗(Ni, Nj)Ni + (e−Ni) (1.15)
while taking the regulatory standard in the other country, Nj , as given. Let (N̂A, N̂B) denote
the Nash Equilibrium of the game between the regulators at t = 0 whenever it exists. I assume
that the initial endowment of consumers (e) is sufficiently large, and that it is not a binding
constraint in equilibrium.
Social welfare given by (1.15) incorporates the fact that banks investment level, ni, equals
Ni, the regulatory upper limit. With probability q, the good state is realized when banks in
country i obtain a total return of RNi. With probability 1− q both countries land in the bad
state. In the bad state, banks perform asset sales as described previously, and manage the
remaining assets, γ∗(Ni, Nj)Ni until t = 2 to obtain a gross return of R per unit. Therefore
the return to the investment in the bad state in country i is Rγ∗(Ni, Nj)Ni. The cost of the
initial investment (Ni) is subtracted to obtain net returns to the investment. Each regulator
takes into account the effect of both countries’ regulatory standards on the price of capital
in the bad state. This is why the fraction of assets that banks can keep after the fire-sales,
γ∗(Ni, Nj) = 1− c/P ∗(Ni, Nj), is written as a function of the regulatory standards in the two
countries.
The following equation gives the first order conditions of regulator i’s problem in (1.15)
∂Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
= qR+ (1− q)R
{
∂γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
Ni + γ
∗(Ni, Nj)
}
− 1 (1.16)
By rearranging the terms, we can write this first order condition as a sum of the marginal
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benefit and marginal cost of increasing Ni, the regulatory standard:
∂Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
= {qR+ (1− q)Rγ∗(Ni, Nj)}+
{
(1− q)R∂γ
∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
Ni − 1
}
(1.17)
When regulator i increases Ni, there will be more investment in the risky asset. The first curly
brackets give the expected gross marginal benefit from increasing Ni: with probability q the
good state is realized and a total return of R is obtained from the additional unit of investment.
With probability 1− q, the bad state is realized, and a total return of Rγ∗(Ni, Nj) is obtained
from the additional investment. In the bad state, the return can be obtained only from a
fraction, γ∗(Ni, Nj), of the original investment, because another fraction of the investment is
sold to global investors.
The second curly brackets in (1.17) give the expected marginal cost of increasing Ni.
Because γ∗(Ni, Nj) is decreasing in Ni, as implied by Lemma 2, a smaller fraction of assets
will be retained by banks if the bad state is realized for higher initial investment levels. The
first term captures this fact: with probability 1− q the bad state is realized, and an additional
unit of investment will decrease the fraction of capital that can be retained by banks of country
i by ∂γ∗(Ni, Nj)Ni, causing a total loss of (∂γ∗(Ni, Nj)/Ni)Ni. Last, ”-1” in the second curly
bracket gives the marginal cost of funds required for the risky investment.
An alternative formulation of regulators’ objective function
We can alternatively write the regulators’ objective function in a way that explicitly shows
the returns to the investment and costs of fire-sales. Start by substituting 1 − c/P for γ∗(·)
function using the derivation obtained in (1.9) to write (1.15) as
Wi(Ni, Nj) = qRNi + (1− q)R
{
1− c
P ∗(Ni, Nj)
}
Ni + (e−Ni)
Add and subtract cNi to the expression above to get
Wi(Ni, Nj) = qRNi + (1− q)R
{
RNi − Rc
P ∗(Ni, Nj)
Ni + cNi − cNi
}
+ (e−Ni)
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Last, rearranging the terms inside the curly brackets gives
Wi(Ni, Nj) = qRNi + (1− q)
{
RNi − [R− P ∗(Ni, Nj)] cNi
P ∗(Ni, Nj)
− cNi
}
+ (e−Ni) (1.18)
Consider this alternative objective function in detail. It is composed of two main terms
as in (1.15): net expected returns in both the good state and the bad state. Because the
first term, q(R − 1)Ni, that gives the net expected return in the good state is clear, I focus
on the latter. The first term inside the curly brackets gives the net total return that could
be obtained from the investment if there were no fire-sales. The second term is the cost of
fire-sales: cNi\P ∗(Ni, Nj) is the amount of assets sold in fire-sales as given by (1.10), where
banks receive P ∗ < R from these assets instead of R. The last term inside the curly brackets,
cNi, is the total cost of restructuring.
Because the two versions of the regulators’ objective function are the same, I will use the
first formulation in the rest of the paper for the sake of analytical convenience, even though
the alternative formulation could be more intuitive.
Regulatory Standards in the Uncoordinated Equilibrium
Having analyzed the problem of regulators, we can turn to investigating the equilibrium of the
game between regulators at t = 0 when they act independently. The aims are to show that
there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of this game, and then to perform comparative
statics. I start by analyzing the properties of the best response functions of regulators. The
following lemma establishes that independent regulators have a unique best response to each
regulatory standard choice by the opponent country.
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions CONCAVITY, ELASTICITY and REGULARITY, each reg-
ulator’s best response is unique valued.
An interesting question in this setup concerns how that unique best response behaves as
regulation in the opponent country changes. Suppose that the regulator of country B decides
to tighten regulation (i.e., reduce NB). How would the regulator of country A optimally react?
The next proposition shows that regulator A optimally chooses to relax its regulatory standard
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(i.e., increase NA), as regulator B imposes stricter regulations. In other words, the optimal
regulatory standards in the two countries are strategic substitutes.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions CONCAVITY, ELASTICITY and REGULARITY, op-
timal regulatory standards in the uncoordinated equilibrium are strategic substitutes.
The intuition for this result is as follows: If regulator B tightens its regulatory standard
by reducing the upper limit on the investment level for its banks, there will be less distressed
assets at t = 1 in the bad state; hence, a higher asset price, P ∗, will be realized. Therefore,
fewer assets will be sold in equilibrium as shown by Lemma 2, which means that banks in
both countries will be able to retain a higher fraction of their initial investment after fire-sales.
This retention will increase the marginal return to investment and initially allow regulator
A to optimally choose a higher upper limit on the investment level (i.e. relax its regulatory
standard).
The next lemma shows that in order to have finite and strictly positive equilibrium in-
vestment levels in the two countries, banks’ return from investment R should not be too low,
or too high. The exact condition on R is given by Assumption RANGE , which states that
1 + c(1− q) < R ≤ 1/q.
Lemma 4. The best responses of each regulator satisfy 0 < N∗i <∞ for i = A,B if Assump-
tion RANGE holds, i.e. if 1 + (1− q)c < R ≤ 1/q.
1 + (1 − q)c is the net expected cost of the investment: each unit of investment requires
one unit of consumption good initially. With probability 1− q bad times are realized, in which
case banks have to incur an extra restructuring cost of c units of consumption goods per unit
of investment. If the return on the investment, R, is less then this expected cost, 1 + (1− q)c,
booth countries’ social welfare will be higher without any investment at all. Therefore, if
R < 1 + (1− q)c, then equilibrium investment levels are zero in both countries. But if R > 1/q
then the expected return to the investment in the good state alone will be higher than initial
cost of investment, which is 1. In this case, even when the entire initial investment is expected
to be lost in the bad state, the net expected return to investment will always be positive. For
sufficiently high initial endowment levels, this case leads to a corner solution in which social
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welfare is maximized by having all endowments invested in the risky asset. I also impose
qR ≤ 1 in order to rule out these inconsequential details and focus on the interesting cases.
Now, we are ready to examine the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the game between
regulators. The nice features of the objective functions of regulators established above help us
to show that a Nash equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions CONCAVITY, ELASTICITY, REGULARITY and RANGE,
at least one pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists in the game between two financial regulators
at t = 0 . Moreover there exists at least one symmetric pure strategy NE.
The next natural question is whether there are multiple equilibria or there is a unique
equilibrium. Fortunately, under the stated previously conditions, we have a unique symmetric
equilibrium of the game between the regulators as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions CONCAVITY, ELASTICITY, REGULARITY and RANGE,
there exists a unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium of the game between the regulators at t = 0 .
Comparative Statics for the Uncoordinated Equilibrium
What happens to the unique regulatory standards of the uncoordinated equilibrium in the
two countries as good state becomes more likely, or if bank’s per unit return from investment,
R, increases? The next proposition shows that in both cases regulatory standards in the two
countries are relaxed (i.e., regulators increase the upper limit on the risky investment).
Proposition 4. Regulatory standards in the uncoordinated symmetric equilibrium become more
lax as q and R increase.
This result is quite intuitive because as the good state becomes more likely (i.e., as q
increases), regulators will face the cost of fire-sales less often and will allow more investment
in equilibrium. But as R increases, returns to investment in both good and bad states also
increase, making the investment socially more profitable.
I conclude this section by showing that in equilibrium, price of the capital good at t = 1
in bad times must be greater than restructuring costs (c). I tentatively assumed this while
discussing banks’ optimal fire-sales decisions at t = 1 after they receive bad shocks. Now
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it is time to prove this claim formally. Under this result, as I have shown, banks optimally
restructure all assets in equilibrium. In other words, as previously stated, scrapping of capital
never arises in equilibrium.
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions CONCAVITY, ELASTICITY, REGULARITY and RANGE,
the equilibrium price of the capital good at t = 1 in bad times satisfies P ∗ > c.
Lemma 5 holds because if regulators allow the investment level in their country (Ni) to
be too high, they know that they will drive down the equilibrium price below the cost of
restructuring in which case banks do not restructure any assets. Therefore, it is never optimal
for any of the regulators to allow such high investment levels, independent of the choice of the
competing regulator.
1.3.4 Internationally Coordinated Regulation
Suppose that there is a higher authority, call it the central regulator, that determines optimal
regulatory standards in these two countries. In practice, the central regulator could be an
international financial institution such as the International Monetary Fund or the Bank for
International Settlements, or it could be an institution created by a binding bilateral agreement
between the two countries. I assume that, for political reasons, the central regulator must
choose the same regulatory standards for both countries. The question that I address in this
section is as follows: Suppose that at the beginning of t = 0, national regulators can either set
regulatory standards independently or simultaneously relinquish their authority to the central
regulator. Would they choose the latter?
I define the central regulator’s problem as follows: it chooses the regulatory standards in
countries A and B, (NA, NB), to maximize the sum of expected social welfare of these countries
as given below
max
NA,NB≥0
GW (NA, NB) = max
NA,NB≥0
∑
i=A,B;j 6=i
{q(R−1)Ni+(1−q)[Rγ∗(Ni, Nj)Ni−Ni]} (1.19)
In other words, the central regulator maximizes the sum of the objective functions of indi-
vidual regulators. For symmetric countries, it is natural to assume that each country receives
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an equal weight in the central regulator’s objective function.17 I denote the internationally op-
timal common regulatory standards by (N˜ , N˜) and compare them to the regulatory standards
in the uncoordinated symmetric equilibrium, (N̂ , N̂).
Another way to state the central regulator’s problem for symmetric countries involves
thinking of the central regulator as choosing total investment level across the two countries,
N = NA +NB, to maximize their overall welfare. After determining the optimal total invest-
ment level N , it imposes N˜i = N/2 for i = A,B where
N = arg max
N≥0
q(R− 1)N + (1− q)[Rγ˜∗(N)N −N ] (1.20)
It is easy to see that the two alternative problems for the central regulator given by (1.19) and
(1.20) are the same due to the countries’ symmetry.
Now, we can compare the internationally optimal regulatory standards to the standards
that arise as a result of strategic interaction between regulators. The following proposition
shows that a central regulator will impose tighter regulatory standards (i.e., a lower N) com-
pared to what would have been chosen by independent regulators.
Proposition 5. N˜ < N̂ , i.e. the central regulator chooses tighter regulatory standards com-
pared to the standards chosen by independent national regulators in the uncoordinated equilib-
rium.
Proposition 5 shows that due to the systemic risk caused by asset fire-sales, standards cho-
sen by independent national regulators are inefficiently lax compared to regulatory standards
that would be chosen by a central regulator. A central regulator maximizes the total welfare
in the two countries, and hence internalizes the systemic externalities that arise from fire-sales.
A central regulator takes into account the fact that allowing more investment in the risky asset
by relaxing regulatory standards in one country reduces the welfare of the other country due
to higher numbers of fire-sales during distress times.
17Note that the central regulator does not consider the welfare of the global investors. However, the results
of the paper are robust to this generalization.
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Is voluntary cooperation possible?
We see that investment levels will be higher in both countries if regulators act strategically.
But will countries ever benefit from relinquishing their regulatory authority to a central regu-
lator that imposes tighter standards in both countries? The following proposition shows that
symmetric countries always benefit from relinquishing their authority to a central regulator.
Proposition 6. If the countries are symmetric then both regulators prefer to deliver their
authority to a central systemic risk regulator, i.e. Wi(N˜i, N˜j) ≥Wi(N̂i, N̂j) holds for i = A,B.
When regulators act independently, each allows investment into the risky asset up to the
point where the expected marginal benefit from the risky investment is equal to the expected
domestic marginal cost of the investment. However, at this level of investment, the marginal
total cost across the two countries far exceeds the sum of the marginal benefits. This happens
because neither regulator considers the adverse effect of increasing investment level on the
welfare of the other country. Yet, the central regulator can choose a total investment level
in the risky asset where the total marginal benefit is equal to the total marginal cost, and
hence can improve the overall welfare of the two countries. Therefore, it is in the interest of
the regulators of symmetric countries to simultaneously surrender their authority to a central
regulator.
1.4 Asymmetric Countries
In the previous section, we saw that regulators of symmetric countries are always better off
by relinquishing their authority to a central regulator. Can a similar argument be made for
countries that are asymmetric in some dimensions? In other words, if there are differences
across countries, would national regulators still benefit from relinquishing their authority to a
central regulator? In this section, I answer this and the following questions that arise when
there are asymmetries across countries: How would the asymmetries affect regulation levels
in the two countries in equilibrium? How do central regulation levels compare to regulation
levels chosen by national regulators independently? Which countries are more likely to accept
a common central regulation?
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I focus on differences in returns on the risky investment across countries. In particular, I
assume that banks in country A are uniformly more productive than banks in country B. In
terms of the parameters of the model, this assumption can be stated as RA > RB.
18
Furthermore, to simplify the following analysis, I also assume that F ′(0) ≤ 1 in this
section.19 Under this assumption, global investors will purchase capital only if the price of
capital falls below one. This assumption also ruled out possible multiple equilibria in the
capital goods market at t = 1 when there are return differences between countries. Note that
from global investors’ perspectives, the capital goods in the two countries are still identical at
t = 1.
The next proposition shows that when regulators act independently, the regulator of the
high-return country chooses lower regulatory standards (i.e., a higher N) in equilibrium. This
result complies with Proposition 4 in the previous section where we have seen that equilibrium
investment levels increase in the return to investments given by R.
Proposition 7. If RA > RB, then N̂A > N̂B in the uncoordinated equilibrium.
Now, we can compare common central regulatory standars to uncoordinated regulation
levels when there are asymmetries between the countries. The next proposition shows that
in order for a common central regulation to be acceptable to both regulators, it must require
stricter regulatory standards in both countries compared to the uncoordinated regulatory
standards.
Proposition 8. There exists no central regulation level N > min{N̂A, N̂B}.
The proof of Proposition 8 makes use of the envelope theorem to show that welfare of
18This assumption is justified when there is segregation between the investment markets of the two countries.
There is both a theoretical and a practical reason for making this assumption. From the theoretical perspective,
this assumption shuts down the externality channel that operates through the competition between banks from
different countries in loan markets and allows me to focus on regulatory spillovers that operate through asset
prices during times of distress. The previous literature considered the regulatory spillovers operating through
competition in loan and deposit markets, which shows us when cooperation is justified under those extarnalities
(e.g., Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006)). From a practical point of view, there are well documented return
differences accross countries and a large body of literature explains those differences based on levels of technology
and human capital as well as institutional factors. I just take the return differences across countries as given,
and examine the desirability of coordination of macro-prudential policies in a world characterized by those
structural differences.
19This assumption simplifies the analysis by making the demand function of global investors independent of
the return differences between the countries.
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a country is decreasing in the investment level of the other country. In order to forego the
authority to independently and optimally choose regulatory standards as a response to the
regulatory standards chosen by the other country, each regulator must be compensated by
a stricter regulatory standard (i.e., a lower N) in the other country. Therefore, any com-
mon regulation level above N̂B, which is the minimum of the two regulation levels given the
assumption that RA > RB, will always be rejected by regulator A.
This discussion implies that if a common regulation level is accepted by the regulator of the
high return country, it will always be accepted by the regulator of the low return country. This
happens because common regulation reduces investment levels in both countries, as shown
by Proposition 11. However, it reduces investment levels more in the high return country,
compared to the low return country. Therefore, if the regulator of the high return country is
willing to accept a common regulation level, it will necessarily be accepted by the regulator of
the low return country as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 6. For any common regulation level N such that WA(N,N) > WA(N̂A, N̂B) we have
WB(N,N) > WB(N̂B, N̂A).
Lemma 6 allows us to focus on the welfare of country A in search of mutually acceptable
common regulatory standards. We may define Nm as the regulatory standard that maximizes
the welfare of country A if it is uniformly imposed in both countries. Formally, I define Nm
as follows:
Definition 1. Nm ≡ arg max
N
WA(N,N)
Given this definition, we can write the net maximum benefit from common central regula-
tion to country A as WA(N
m, Nm)−WA(N̂A, N̂B). The next proposition shows that this net
maximum benefit is decreasing in the differences between the countries.
Proposition 9. Suppose that F ′(0) ≤ 1. Let s ≡ RA−RB > 0. Then for any RA, there exists
ŝ ∈ (0, RA − 1) such that WA(Nm, Nm) −WA(N̂A, N̂B) ≥ 0 if s ≤ ŝ, and WA(Nm, Nm) −
WA(N̂A, N̂B) < 0 otherwise.
Proposition 9 provides the main result of this section: if the return differences between
the two countries are above a threshold, then at least the high return country will be worse
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off if a common regulation level is imposed across the two countries, even if the common
regulation is chosen such that it maximizes the welfare of the high-return country. Large
return differences will imply that such a common regulation level is too strict compared to the
regulatory standard that would be chosen by the high-return country in the uncoordinated
equilibrium. Therefore, welfare of the high return country will fall if it decides to accept
common regulatory standards in the face of high return differences between countries. In
other words, Proposition 9 shows that voluntary cooperation can exist only between sufficiently
similar countries. If the differences across countries are sufficiently high, then at least one of
them will be worse off by accepting common central regulation.
1.5 Systemic Failures in Regulated Economies
In this section I examine systemic failures when the two countries are symmetric. By systemic
failures I refer to the fact that all banks in the two countries become insolvent after fire-sales.
Systemic failures will occur if the asset prices in the crisis state are so low that the returns
from investments that could be retained by banks after fire-sales are not enough to cover the
promised return to depositors, which is simply equal to the initial value of the investment.
Systemic failures might occur even in regulated economies. Because countries are symmetric
and we assume perfectly correlated shocks across countries, systemic failures, if they occur,
will happen in both countries at the same time. We can write the systemic failure condition
in equilibrium as
Rγ∗(N̂ , N̂)N̂ < N̂ (1.21)
where N̂ denotes symmetric equilibrium investment levels. The left hand side is the (expected)
return from investments that could be retained by banks after the fire-sales, and the right
hand side is the promised payments to depositors, which are simply the initial value of the
investment.
For the rest of the analysis I will work with a particular functional form for which I can
obtain a closed-form solution for equilibrium investment levels. The technology of global
investors is given by: F (y) = R ln(1 + y). I solve the model for this particular functional
form in Appendix A. Using this closed form solution, we can show that the systemic failure
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condition given by (1.21) above is
N̂ >
R
2c
(
R− 1− c
R− 1
)
≡ N c (1.22)
where N c is defined as the critical equilibrium investment level beyond which banks fail in the
bad state (i.e., if N̂ > N c then banks in the two countries become insolvent in the bad state).
We have already seen that N̂ is increasing in q. This helps to prove the following result.
Proposition 10. Let F (y) = R ln(1 + y). If 1 + c < R < R̂ then there exists a q̂ ∈ (0, 1/R)
such that for all q ≥ q̂ we have that N̂(q) ≥ N c. In other words, for such R, if the probability
of the good state is higher than q̂, banks fail in the bad state in the uncoordinated equilibrium.
If R ≤ 1 + c then banks always fail in the bad state, and if R ≥ R̂ then banks never fail in the
bad state where
R̂ ≡ 1
2
(
2 + c+
√
c
√
8 + c
)
(1.23)
By Proposition 4 we have already seen that equilibrium investment level is increasing in q
and R. Proposition 10 shows that if R is sufficiently high, then systemic failures do not occur.
In order to prove this, I show that the difference N c− N̂ is monotonically increasing in R, and
that this difference is positive for any value of q if R is sufficiently high. Remember that banks
fail if N c < N̂ , which means that they will not fail as long as the difference N c− N̂ is positive.
But if R has moderate values, given by 1 + c < R < R̂, then banks fail in the bad state only
if the probability of good state, q, is sufficiently high. For moderate values of R, a sufficiently
high q leads to systemic failures because N̂ is increasing q, whereas N c is independent of q
as can be seen from (1.22). Hence, for any value of R such that 1 + c < R < R̂, there is a
sufficiently high q such that the difference N c − N̂ is negative. Last, if R is sufficiently low,
given by R < 1 + c, then total return from maintained assets after fire-sales is never enough
to cover the initial value of the investment, because 1 + c is the marginal cost of funds for the
investment, if the bad state is expected to occur with certainty. In order to prove this, I show
that for these low values of R, the difference N c − N̂ is negative for any value of q. Therefore
in this case, systemic failures will surely happen in the bad state.
The region of parameters for which systemic failures occur in the bad state is illustrated
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in the left panel of Figure 1.4. The horizontal axis in Figure 1.4 measures q, the probability
of success, from 0 to 1, and the vertical axis measures R, the return to investment, from 1 to
2. Since we assume that Rq ≤ 1, we should ignore the region where Rq > 1 in Figure 1.4.
This region is shaded by grey. The blue region shows the set of R, q pairs for a given c, for
which systemic failures occur in the bad state. Technically, in the blue region we have that
N̂ > N c. There are two horizontal red lines in the left panel of Figure 1.4. The lower one
shows R = 1 + c, and it is clear from the graph that banks fail for any value of q if R ≤ 1 + c.
The higher red line shows R = R̂, and it is again clear from the graph that systemic failures
never occur if R ≥ R̂. Last, if R is between the two red lines (i.e., if 1 + c < R < R̂), then
for any such R there exists some q̂ ∈ (0, 1/R) such that systemic failures occur if q ≥ q̂, as
claimed in Proposition 10.
Figure 1.4: Systemic Failures
It is clear from the analysis above that systemic failures are more likely when the initial
investment level is high. Because central regulation reduces investment levels in both countries,
we can claim that moving to a central regulation can eliminate systemic failures. This can
be observed from the right panel in Figure 1.4 where the parameter values for which systemic
crisis occurs under the common central regulation are shown in blue. The parameter set for
which systemic crisis occurs in the uncoordinated equilibrium is the sum of the colored regions
(the same area as in the left panel). It is clear from this right panel that when countries move
to common central regulation, the parameter set for which systemic failures occur in the bad
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state shrinks. The following lemma shows the parameter values under which systemic crisis
does occur in the bad state in the uncoordinated equilibrium and moving to a common central
regulation eliminates the crisis. Therefore, a common central regulation improves not only the
social welfare, but also the financial stability of coordinating countries.
Lemma 7. For any given R < R̂, there exists some q˜ > q̂, where q̂ is as defined in Propo-
sition 10, such that if q ∈ (q̂, q˜] moving to a central common regulation from the symmetric
uncoordinated equilibrium eliminates the systemic failures in the bad state.
1.6 Extensions: Discussion of Assumptions
In this section, I examine the robustness of the main results with regard to changes in some
of the assumptions in the basic model. I revisit the assumptions of deposit insurance, limited
liability for bank owners, and nonexistence of initial equity capital for banks owners, and show
that the qualitative results do not change when these assumptions are relaxed.
1.6.1 Deposit Insurance
With a deposit insurance fund, banks are able to borrow at constant and zero net interest rate
from consumers because consumers are guaranteed by the fund that they will always recover
their initial investment. If banks do not have sufficient funds to make the promised payments
to consumers following a bad state, the deposit insurance fund steps in, and pays consumers
the deficit between the promised payment and the resources available to a bank.
What happens if there is no deposit insurance? The answer depends on the competitive
structure of the deposit market. I consider two polar cases: first, each bank is a local monopoly
in the deposit market; and second, there is perfect competition between banks in the deposit
market. I begin here with the local monopoly case and discuss the perfect competition case in
Section 1.6.1. When each bank is a local monopoly as in the basic model, the interest on deposit
contracts will be just enough to induce risk-neutral consumers to deposit their endowments
with them. In technical terms, the individual rationality condition for consumers will bind. I
restrict attention to deposit contracts that are in the form of simple debt contracts.20
20There are two justifications for this restriction. First, this assumption is realistic: the deposit contracts
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A bank in country i will choose the amount to borrow and invest in the risky asset, ni,
and the interest rate on the deposits, r, to maximize the net expected profits:
max
r,ni≥0
q(R− r)ni + (1− q) max{(1− c/P )Rni − rni, 0} (1.24)
subject to
qrni + (1− q) min{R(1− c/P )ni, rni} ≥ ni (IR) (1.25)
ni ≤ Ni (1.26)
where 1− c/P = γ is the fraction of assets retained by banks at t = 1 after fire-sales (which,
as before, banks take as given). The bank has to satisfy the individual rationality constraint
of consumers given by (1.25): expected return to deposits must be greater than ni, the initial
deposit of a consumer. A consumer will receive a gross return of rni in the good state which
happens with probability q. In the bad state, which arises with probability 1 − q, he will
obtain the minimum of the promised payment, rni, and the returns available to the bank after
fire-sales Rγni. If Rγni < ni the consumer will experience a loss in the bad state.
As before, the bank is also subject to the maximum investment regulation ni ≤ Ni. Because
the problem of a bank is still linear, it will yield a corner solution as before: there will be either
a maximum investment (ni = Ni), or no investment at all (ni = 0). We can examine the choice
of the investment level (ni) and the choice of deposit rate (r) separately. First, consider the
choice of optimal r for a given investment level. We can see from the problem of banks above
that for a given P there are two cases to consider:
Case 1 R(1− c/P ) > 1. In this case, banks have sufficient resources to cover the initial
borrowing from depositors even in the bad state. Therefore, they will offer zero net interest to
consumers. Banks will set r = 1, and the IR condition will be satisfied with equality. Because
banks make net positive profits in both states of the world, they want to invest as much as
possible. Banks will borrow and invest in the risky asset until the regulatory requirement
binds (ni = Ni). Given that banks invest as much as possible, regulators will choose the
are in the form of simple debt contracts in practice. Second, debt contracts can be justified by assuming that
depositors can observe banks’ asset returns only at a cost. According to Townsend (1979), in the case of costly
state verification, debt contracts will be optimal.
37
same standards in equilibrium as in the basic model. Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium of
Section 1.3 and its qualitative results will prevail.
Case 2 R(1− c/P ) < 1. In this case, returns on the assets retained by banks after fire-
sales are not sufficient to cover the initial borrowing from depositors because R(1−c/P )ni < ni.
Banks have to offer positive net interest rate to consumers in the good state to compensate
for their losses in the bad state. For the IR condition of consumers to be satisfied, r has to be
such that
r ≥ 1− (1− q)R(1− c/P )
q
≡ r∗ (1.27)
This can be seen by rearranging the IR condition (1.25), and noting that min{R(1−c/P )ni, rni} =
R(1−c/P )ni in this case. Banks will offer consumers the lowest r that satisfies (1.27) to maxi-
mize their profits, and hence will set r = r∗. I will check if there is an equilibrium where banks
make maximum investment and regulators choose the same standards as before for such r∗.
Suppose that regulators choose their standards assuming that banks will make the maximum
allowed investment. We know, from the analysis in Section 1.3 that in this case there will be
unique symmetric equilibrium regulatory standards given by (N̂ , N̂). Banks will indeed make
the maximum investment under these regulatory standards if their expected profit is positive.
Because in this case banks receive zero returns in the bad state, their expected profit is equal
to q(R − r∗)ni, as can be seen from (1.24). The expected profit is positive if R > r∗ when
P = P ∗(N̂ , N̂). Using the definition of r∗ in (1.27) this condition can be written as
P >
c(1− q)R
R− 1 (1.28)
Because γ = 1− c/P this condition can be restated as
γ
c(1− q)R
R− 1 (1.29)
In order to see that this is indeed the case in the symmetric equilibrium obtained in Section
1.3 (when γ = γ∗(N̂ , N̂)), rearrange the FOCs of the regulator’s problem given by (1.16) to
get
γ∗(N̂ , N̂) =
1− qR
(1− q)R −
∂γ(N̂ , N̂)
∂Ni
Ni >
1− qR
(1− q)R (1.30)
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since ∂γ(N̂ , N̂)/∂Ni < 0 as shown in the proof of Lemma 3. Therefore, the symmetric equi-
librium obtained under the deposit insurance will prevail when this assumption is removed.
No deposit insurance and perfectly competitive deposit markets
Now, instead of assuming that each bank is a local monopoly in the deposit market, I assume
that the deposit market is perfectly competitive, and analyze the robustness of the results
to this change in the environment. If the deposit market is perfectly competitive banks will
earn zero profits because consumers will get all of the returns on the risky investment. Each
bank in country i will choose the amount of investment in the risky asset (ni) to maximize the
expected utility of a representative depositor:
max
0≤ni≤Ni0
qRni + (1− q)Rγni − ni (1.31)
With probability q, the consumers will receive a gross return of Rni, and with probability
1− q, they will receive (1− c/P )Rni, which is the return on the assets retained by their bank
after fire-sales. The cost of the initial investment, ni, is subtracted to obtain net expected
return to deposits. For consumers who choose to deposit their endowments with the bank,
the net expected return must be greater than zero, and if it is greater than zero, consumers
will choose to invest everything they have. Hence, the regulatory requirement,ni ≤ Ni will
bind. But if regulators assume that banks will make the maximum investment, we know from
Section 1.3 that there will be a unique set of regulatory standards given by (N̂ , N̂). Last, we
have to check whether banks will indeed chose maximum investment if (Ni, Nj) = (N̂ , N̂).
Rearranging (1.31) shows that the expected net utility of a representative depositor will be
greater than zero if
P >
c(1− q)R
R− 1 (1.32)
This is the same condition as (1.28). We know from the analysis above that this condition is
satisfied in the symmetric equilibrium of Section 1.3, i.e. when P = P ∗(N̂ , N̂). Therefore, we
can conclude that the symmetric equilibrium obtained under the deposit insurance will prevail
when this assumption is removed regardless of whether the deposit market is competitive or
each bank is a local monopoly in the deposit market.
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1.6.2 Limited Liability
In the basic model, I assumed that banks are protected by limited liability. Limited liabil-
ity assumption means that bank profits are (weakly) positive in each state of the world. If
returns to the assets of a bank fall short of its liabilities, then the bank owners receive zero
profits. Banks have always wanted to make unlimited investment in the risky asset under this
assumption. Now instead, suppose that bank owners have some wealth, or endowment at the
last period that can be seized by depositors if the returns on assets are not enough to cover
the promised payments to depositors.21
When there is no limited liability, a bank in country i chooses 0 ≤ ni ≤ Ni to maximize
the expected profits:
max
0≤ni≤Ni0
qRni + (1− q)R(1− c/P )ni − ni (1.33)
where P is the price of capital in the fire-sale market in the bad state at t = 1. Each bank
takes this price as given. This problem is essentially the same as the problem of banks when
there is no deposit insurance and the deposit market is perfectly competitive. This can be
seen by comparing problems (1.24) and (1.33).
The first order conditions for the problem of banks is
∂pi
∂ni
= qR+ (1− q)R(1− c/P )− 1 (1.34)
The first order condition will be positive if and only if
P >
c(1− q)R
R− 1 ≡ P (1.35)
In other words, as long as P ≥ P , banks will still want to make unlimited investment in the
risky asset. On the other hand, if regulators expect banks to set ni = Ni, they will choose
the same set of regulatory standards as in the case with limited liability. Note that as long as
21Instead, the negative utility of bank owners in this case can be interpreted as the disutility of legal punish-
ment for bankruptcy.
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regulators internalize the losses of bank owners due to fire-sales, their objective function will be
the same as (1.15). Therefore, in order to show that equilibrium regulatory standards do not
change when the limited liability assumption is removed, we have to check whether the price
of capital in the uncoordinated equilibrium satisfies P ∗(N̂ , N̂) ≥ P . This is again the same
condition as (1.28). The analysis in Section 1.6.1 showed that this condition indeed holds in
equilibrium. Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium and the qualitative results obtained under
the limited liability assumption will prevail when we remove this assumption.
1.6.3 Initial Bank Equity Capital
In the basic model, I also assumed that banks have no initial endowment of their own that
they can invest in the risky asset. Because banks raised necessary funds for investment from
the deposit market, the liability side of their balance sheets contained only debt and not any
equity capital.22
In this section, I assume that banks have an initial endowment of E units of consumption
good which they have to invest in the risky asset. This equity is costly: the opportunity
cost of equity to bank owners, ρ, is greater than one, the cost of insured deposits. These
two assumptions are a common way of introducing equity capital to a banking model (see
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), Hellmann et al. (2000), Repullo (2004) among others). The
assumption that the amount of equity capital is fixed captures the fact that it is difficult for
banks to raise equity capital at short notice.
When there is bank equity capital, regulation will take the form of a minimum capital ratio
requirement. Let ki = E/ni be the actual capital ratio of a bank in country i. In this case,
regulation will require banks to have ki ≥ Ki, where Ki is the capital adequacy requirement
in country i.
Given its equity, and the price of capital goods in the bad state of t = 1, each bank chooses
22The term equity capital should not be confused with the capital good. Any initial endowment of bank
owners will still be in the form of consumption good. I use the term ”equity capital” to refer to bank owners’
own endowments that they invest in the bank.
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how much to invest in the risky asset (i.e., ni as before) to maximize expected profits:
max
0≤ni≤Ni0
q(Rni − (ni − E)) + (1− q)max {Rγni − (ni − E), 0} − ρE (1.36)
subject to the capital regulation
ki =
E
ni
≥ Ki (1.37)
Note that ni−E is the amount of funds borrowed from the local deposit market. We can write
the capital ratio requirement condition as
ni ≤ E
Ki
≡ Ni (1.38)
This analysis shows that there is one-to-one mapping from capital regulations to the form of
regulation used in the main text. The banks’ problem does not change: they still want to
invest in the risky asset as much as possible as long as the net expected return is positive. The
minimum capital requirement binds (i.e., banks will choose ni = E/Ki in an equilibrium with
positive investment levels).
Consider the regulators’ problem after equity is introduced to the model. Regulators
will anticipate that for a given capital ratio requirement, Ki, banks will choose their total
investment level such that this requirement binds: ni = E/Ki. Because banks will raise
E/Ki−E = (1−Ki)E/Ki units of consumption goods from the local deposit market, we can
write regulators’ objective function as
Wi(Ki,Kj) = q
[
R
E
Ki
− E
Ki
]
+ (1− q)
[
Rγ̂
(
E
Ki
,
E
Kj
)
E
Ki
− E
Ki
]
(1.39)
The function γ̂(·) is the same as the function γ(·) except that it is defined over the minimum
capital ratios (Ki,Kj), not over the total investment levels. It represents the fraction of initial
assets that a bank retains after fire-sales. If we define Ni ≡ E/Ki we can express the objective
function above as
max
Ni≥0
Wi(Ni, Nj) = max
Ni≥0
q(R− 1)Ni + (1− q)[Rγ∗(Ni, Nj)Ni −Ni] (1.40)
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This objective function is exactly the same as the regulators’ problem in the main text. There-
fore, all qualitative results in the main section will carry on when we introduce costly bank
equity and redefine regulation as a minimum capital ratio requirement.
Note that when we introduce costly equity, the net expected return on the risky investment
must be sufficiently large to cover the opportunity cost of internal bank equity, ρE, for banks.
Otherwise, banks will choose not to invest in the risky asset at all. For this reason, the set of
parameters where we have strictly positive investment in equilibrium is smaller under costly
equity.
1.7 Conclusion
I have examined the incentives of national regulators to coordinate regulatory policies in the
presence of systemic risk in global financial markets, using a two-country, three-period model.
Banks borrow from local deposit markets and invest in risky long-term assets in the initial
period. They may face negative shocks in the interim period that force them to sell assets.
Asset sales of banks feature the characteristics of a fire-sale: assets are sold at a discount,
and the higher the number of assets sold, the lower the market price of assets is. The asset
market in the interim period is competitive. Each bank treats the asset price as given, and
therefore neglects the effects of its sales on other banks. Due to this externality, correlated
asset fire-sales by banks generate systemic risk across national financial markets.
If the regulatory standard is relaxed in one country, banks in this country invest more in
the risky asset in the initial period. If the bad state arises in the interim period, these banks
are forced to sell more assets, causing the asset price to fall further. A lower asset price will
increase the cost of distress for the banks in the other country as well. Banks may even default
in equilibrium if the asset prices fall below a threshold.
I have shown that, in the absence of cooperation, independent regulators choose inefficiently
low regulation compared to regulatory standards that would be chosen by a central regulator.
A central regulator takes the systemic risk into account and improves welfare in cooperating
countries by imposing higher regulatory standards. Therefore, it is incentive compatible for
national regulators of symmetric countries to relinquish their authority to a central regulator.
I have also considered the incentives of regulators when there are asymmetries between
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countries with a focus on the asymmetries in asset returns. In particular, I have assumed that
banks in one country are uniformly more productive than the banks in the other country in
terms of managing long-term assets. I have shown that cooperation would voluntarily emerge
only between sufficiently similar countries. In particular, the regulator in the high-return
country chooses lower regulatory standards in equilibrium and is less willing to compromise
on stricter regulatory standards.
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Chapter 2
Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Bank Capital Regulations
2.1 Introduction
The first Basel capital adequacy standard signed by G-10 countries in 1988 focused on creating
a level playing field for internationally active banks and improving their stability. Somewhat
unexpectedly, Basel bank capital adequacy standards received an extensive attention from all
around the world, and over hundred countries voluntarily adopted Basel I (Pattison, 2006).
Basel I updated in 2004 with more sophisticated rules and principles, popularly known as
Basel II. A survey done by Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 2006 showed that 95
countries (comprising 13 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) member countries
plus 82 non-BCBS jurisdictions) were planning to implement Basel II by 2015. These interests
suggest that Basel principles have become a model for capital regulation of national banking
systems in both developed and developing countries.
The adoption of Basel principles by the majority of countries around the globe is an impor-
tant fact, however what is more important is how countries are actually implementing those
principals in practice. The Basel bank regulation principles are rich and complex in nature and
this gives countries a substantial amount of leeway in their implementation (Concetta Chiuri
et al., 2002). A country may announce adoption of 8% minimum capital ratio (the percentage
of a bank’s capital to its risk-weighted assets) that is required by Basel I and Basel II. However,
the effective capital adequacy ratio will be determined by how the regulator of this country
allows domestic banks to choose the numerator (equity capital) and the denominator (risk
weighted assets) of this ratio. For example, a regulator can loosely define the items that banks
could include in the equity capital. In another example, the risk weights in the denominator
may not reflect the market risk or credit risk of a bank contrary to the Basel recommendations.
Fortunately, a carefully executed survey series by the World Bank allows us to compare the
actual implementation of Basel bank capital regulations across over hundred countries. These
surveys, conducted four times between 1999 and 2012, reveal that the stringency of bank capital
regulations not only differ by significant amount across countries (see Figure B.1), but also
varies over time for a given country (see Figure B.2). The aim of this paper is to investigate the
empirical determinants of this variation based on theories of capital regulation and previous
empirical studies. I develop testable hypotheses from the literature in order to investigate the
effects of the structure of the banking system and overall economic characteristics of countries
on the stringency of bank capital regulations.
Theoretical motivations for bank capital regulations mainly focus on the role of capital in
creation of incentives for bank owners to take socially efficient levels of risk. Moral hazard and
agency problems often cause bank owners and managers to take excessive risks. Incorrectly
priced deposit insurance, created to prevent bank runs in the first place, and limited liability
are widely blamed for distorting risk behavior of bank owners (Kroszner, 1998; Allen and Gale,
2003). Deposit insurance and limited liability provide a safety net for bank owners in which
they reap the benefits of excessive risk taking in “good times” but do not bear the full costs
in “bad times”. Regulators expect bank owners to behave more prudently and responsibly if
they have “a skin in the game”, which happens when bank owners invest their own capital
in the bank. Another justification for capital regulations is the existence of welfare-relevant
pecuniary externalities (Allen and Gale, 2003; Lorenzoni, 2008). An important example of a
pecuniary externality is the systemic risk, where failure of a single or a group of banks trigger
others and force the whole system into distress or complete collapse.
In a recent study, Kara (2013) justifies capital regulations under the existence of a pecuniary
externality that creates systemic risk within and across borders. The objective of Kara (2013)
is to examine the incentives of national regulators to coordinate minimum capital ratios in the
presence of systemic risk in global financial markets. In a two-country and three-period model,
correlated asset fire-sales of banks in different countries generate systemic risk across national
financial markets. Relaxing regulatory standards in one country increases both the cost and
the severity of crises for both countries in this framework. In the absence of coordination
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independent regulators choose inefficiently low levels of macro-prudential regulation. A central
regulator internalizes the systemic risk and hence can improve the welfare of coordinating
countries. Kara (2013) shows that common central regulation voluntarily emerges only between
sufficiently similar countries. This is due to the fact that, asymmetric countries choose different
levels of macro-prudential regulation when they act independently. In particular, a high return
country chooses a lower minimum capital ratio than a low return country because higher
average returns allows the country to take on more risk. For example, according to Kara
(2013), everything else equal, a country where average return to investment is high such as
China, is expected to choose a lower capital ratio than a country with low average return to
investment such as the US. This is the first hypothesis tested in this paper.
Stock market returns or real GDP growth rate can be used as a proxy for the average returns
to investment in Kara (2013). In this paper, I choose the latter for a couple of reasons.1 First,
GDP growth rate is a good proxy for average returns to investment in an economy, and it is the
most important benchmark for an economy that policy makers base decisions upon. Second,
there are many under-capitalized developing countries in our sample, and GDP growth rate
is more representative of overall average returns than the stock market gains for this group.
Lastly, GDP growth rate data is more easily available for a large number of countries and
much less volatile than stock market returns.
I derive the second testable hypothesis from Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) who justify
capital regulations based on limited liability and existence of deposit insurance. They show
that regulators who are more concerned about the profits of the banking sector as opposed
to financial stability choose less stringent capital regulations. This the second hypothesis
that is tested in this paper. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) consider a two-country model
with a single bank in each country. Regulators of the two countries compete by setting the
minimum capital ratios. A lower capital ratio allows domestic banks to extend loans in both
countries but at the same time decreases average returns. Banks can make their loans safer
by costly monitoring. However, lower returns, induced by a lower capital ratio in one country,
decreases the marginal benefit of monitoring for the banks in both countries. This results in
1I performed robustness check using available stock market return data and the qualitative results did not
change.
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lower monitoring effort, and hence the whole financial system becomes less stable. Therefore,
the capital regulation introduces an externality that national regulators do not internalize
when they act independently. Regulators choose capital ratios to maximize expected domestic
social welfare which is a weighted average of bank profits and a measure of financial stability.
Regulators can differ in terms of the weights that they attach to bank profits in their objective
functions. This weight reflects the degree to which regulators are captured by the financial
institutions under their control. They show that the country with a higher regulatory capture
chooses a lower minimum capital ratio.
I use the fraction of government ownership of banks as a proxy for the regulatory capture.
One would expect that if the government owns an important fraction of banks, it will have a
larger stake in the financial sector, and hence its incentives would be more aligned with those
of the banks. Therefore, I will test if there is a negative relationship between the fraction of
banks owned by the government and the stringency of capital regulations.
Third, I test if the stringency of capital regulations is significantly related to the competi-
tiveness of the banking sector. Since one main theoretical justification for capital requirements
is to limit excessive risk taking by banks, one would expect regulators to respond to measures
that affect how much risk banks are willing to take.2 Competitiveness of the banking sector
has been considered as one of the main determinants of risk taking incentives of banks (Allen
and Gale, 2004). In other words, it has always been thought that there is a close connection
between competitiveness and riskiness of financial sectors. The literature traditionally mea-
sured the competitiveness of a financial sector by the inverse of n-bank concentration ratio or
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.3
There are two contradicting views on the relationship between concentration and financial
stability. The conventional view, which is also called the “concentration-stability” view by
Berger et al. (2004), posits that more concentrated financial sectors with a few large banks are
more stable. This view predicts that large banks in concentrated markets are more efficient
2Both theoretical and empirical literature produce mixed predictions on the effectiveness of capital regulations
in limiting the risk taking behavior of banks. See VanHoose (2007) for an extensive survey of this literature.
3 Claessens and Laeven (2004) empirically challenge this traditional approach. They create an index of
competitiveness, which they call H-statistics, from a structural model, and using bank level data from 50
countries find no evidence that this index is negatively correlated with the concentration ratios.
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and better diversified, and they have larger charter values at stake. Therefore, they are less
inclined to take excessive risks. Furthermore, it is easier for regulators and market participants
to monitor the health of a few large banks than many small banks. In short, conventional
view asserts that there is a trade-off between competition and financial stability. Keeley
(1990), Allen and Gale (2000, Chapter 8), Hellmann et al. (2000), Acharya (2001), Repullo
(2004) provide theoretical support for this view. This argument is also supported by the
empirical evidence provided in Rhoades and Rutz (1982) (using a sample of 6,500 unit banks
in the US between 1969-78), Keeley (1990), Dick (2006) and Beck et al. (2006) (using data
on 69 countries from 1980 to 1997). The latter study shows that crises are less likely in
more concentrated banking systems even after controlling for differences in commercial bank
regulatory policies, national institutions affecting competition, macroeconomic conditions, and
shocks to the economy.
The conventional framework also creates a justification for bank regulation because the
only way to remove the trade-off between competition and financial stability would be a gov-
ernment intervention into the financial sector. Regulation of bank capital has been one of
the most common instruments used by regulators around the world to ensure the existence of
competition and financial stability at the same time (Allen and Gale, 2003).
Acharya (2001) establishes a direct theoretical connection between optimal capital regula-
tions and the intensity of competition in the deposit market. He considers both single-country
and multi-country models, and shows that as the competition in the deposit market becomes
more stringent, banks take on more risk. He measures competition by the number of banks
in the deposit market where larger number of banks corresponds to more competitive banking
sector.4 Therefore, it may be optimal for the regulator to tighten the stringency of capital
regulations as a response to increasing competition in the deposit market.
On the opposite side, the “concentration-fragility” view asserts that there is a negative
relationship between concentration and financial stability: an increase in concentration reduces
the stability of the banking sector. In other words, this view predicts that more competitive
banking sectors are more stable. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) show that the trade-off between
4Number of banks is used, in a similar way to the concentration ratio, as a proxy for competitiveness by
some other studies as well such as Boyd and De Nicolo (2005).
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competition and financial stability, as is supposed by the conventional view, crucially depends
on the assumption that banks’ optimal asset allocations are determined by solving a portfolio
problem that takes asset prices and return distributions as given. They show that when same
number of banks are allowed to compete in the loan market as well as the deposit market, and if
banks are facing moral hazard from borrowers in the loan market, the banking sector becomes
less risky as it gets more competitive. They measure competitiveness with the number of banks.
Proponents of this view also argue that existence of a few large banks generates an implicit
“too-big-to-fail” guarantee, and create incentives for banks to take excessive risks. Jayaratne
and Strahan (1998) (using US bank data between 1975-92), De Nicolo´ (2000), Nicolo´ et al.
(2004), Boyd et al. (2006), De Nicolo` and Loukoianova (2007) and Schaeck et al. (2009) provide
empirical support for the “concentration-fragility” view.
In addition to studies that take a particular view in this discussion, some studies argue
that relationship between competition and financial stability is complex. Allen and Gale (2004)
consider a series of models and show that different models provide different predictions. The
models considered include general equilibrium models of financial intermediaries and markets,
agency models, models of spatial competition, Schumpeterian competition, and contagion.
Their analysis suggest that general equilibrium and Schumpeterian competition models require
coexistence of competition and financial stability for efficiency, as opposed to the trade-off
between those two as is conventionally supposed.
To sum, the theoretical and empirical evidence with respect to the relationship between
concentration ratio and riskiness of the banking sector is mixed: higher concentration ratio
may increase or decrease banks’ incentive to take excessive risks. If regulators respond higher
concentration in the banking sector by relaxing capital regulations, they must be perceiving
lower risks in the sector as a result of higher concentration. Hence, a negative relationship
between the stringency of bank capital regulations and concentration ratio in our regressions
will support the conventional “concentration-stability” hypothesis. On the other hand, if reg-
ulators respond higher concentration by tightening capital regulations they must be perceiving
higher risks in the sector as a result of higher concentration. Therefore, in the regressions,
a positive relationship between the stringency of bank capital regulations and concentration
ratio will support the “concentration-fragility” hypothesis.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the related literature.
Section 3 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and explana-
tory variables. Section 4 explains the econometric methodology. Section 5 contains the results
for the static model. Section 6 presents a dynamic model and the results under the dynamic
model. Section 7 contains robustness checks. Two extensions are presented in Section 8: A
logistic regression using the individual components of the capital stringency index, and esti-
mation of different coefficients for advanced and emerging countries using interaction terms.
Section 9 is the conclusion. Some graphs and tables are included in the Appendix.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper is a part of the broad literature that investigates the determinants of bank reg-
ulations in general. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates
the empirical determinants of cross country and over time variation in the stringency of bank
capital regulations in particular. There are three competing theories that explain choice of a
broader set of bank regulations. These are the private interest, public interest and political-
institutional theories of regulatory change. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Barth et al.
(2006) provide a comparative summary of these three theories.
Briefly, the private interest theory, which is also called the economic theory, posits that
private interest groups use political power to enact regulations that maximize their private
benefits at the expense of more dispersed groups. Public interest theory suggests that govern-
ment intervention corrects market failures and maximizes social welfare. The third group of
views stress the role of beliefs and ideology or the institutional structures in shaping regulatory
choices.
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) use a hazard model to investigate which of the three theories
better explain the deregulations in the US banking sector after 1970s. They show that the
private-interest theory of regulation can account for the pattern of bank branching deregu-
lation of the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, they argue that branching deregulations affect
small banks differently than large banks and therefore relative power of these groups influence
regulatory choices.
On the other hand, Barth et al. (2006) asses whether cross-country differences in political
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institutions explain national choices of supervisory and regulatory policies. They use a cross-
sectional data from the 1999 World Banks survey of bank regulations (one of the four surveys
that is used in this study). They show that the organization and operation of political systems
shape bank supervisory and regulatory practices.
This study has a couple of differences from Barth et al. (2006). First, the aim of the study
is to explain the cross-country and over-time variation in the stringency of capital regulations
in particular whereas Barth et al. (2006) focus on the cross-country variation in broader bank
supervisory and regulatory practices such as bank activity restrictions, strength of private
monitoring and power of banking supervisors. Second, the focus of this study is to explain
the variation seen in the data based on the the economic and financial structure of countries,
while Barth et al. (2006) are mainly interested in investigating the institutional and political
determinants of bank regulations. In this study, I explicitly and implicitly control for such
political and institutional characteristics of countries. Third, different than Barth et al. (2006)
I employ a panel data set which allows explaining not only the cross-country differences in
capital regulations but also the change that occurs over time in these regulations.
The discussion above suggests that this study can be viewed as a public interest explanation
of capital regulations across countries. I assume that given a country’s tastes, endowments and
economic structure, each nation chooses an efficient level of bank capital regulation. Barth
et al. (2006) call this view the “Coasian Theorem of Bank Regulation” after Nobel Laureate
Ronald Coase. While the focus of this paper is on the public interest view of regulation, the
estimation strategy controls for the fact that the regulations may not be set from a welfare
maximizing point of view by using the fixed effects and dynamic panel data regressions, or by
including appropriate control variables.
There is also a literature that examines the variation in actual bank capital ratios but
not the overall stringency of bank capital regulations. An important part of this literature
discusses whether capital ratios in practice are pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. Some studies
focus on bank data from a single country, whereas some others use bank data from several
countries. Notable studies in this literature include Bikker and Metzemakers (2004), Ayuso
et al. (2004), and Andersen (2011).
In a related study, Brewer et al. (2008) investigate the cross country differences in actual
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bank capital ratios of internationally active banks in 12 developed nations. Their explanatory
variables include bank-specific factors such as the bank size, country-specific macroeconomic
factors such as the real GDP growth rate, country-specific public and regulatory policy factors,
and control variables such as the differences in accounting standards. This study differs from
Brewer et al. (2008) mainly in its interest of explaining the regulatory choices of bank capital
regulations, not the actual capital ratios of individual banks. Furthermore, their focus is only
on 12 developed countries, whereas I investigate the determinants of capital regulations using
a sample of 22 developed and 61 developing economies.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This study employs an unbalanced panel data set. The measure used for the stringency of
bank capital regulations is the “Overall Capital Stringency” index created by James R. Barth,
Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine based on extensive World Bank surveys on bank regulations
initiated by these authors in late 1990s. These surveys were conducted four times and represent
the situation of bank regulations around the world at the end of 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2011.5
The last survey includes around 300 hundred questions, and 180 countries responded to at
least one of the four surveys.
This study restricts attention to a smaller set of countries. Our sample consist of 83 major
countries that are included in a recent study by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012). This smaller
sample does not include low income countries and tiny countries some of which are known as
offshore financial centers such as British Virgin Islands or Mauritius. Using the classification
in Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), there are 22 advanced and 61 emerging countries in our
sample. Table B.1 list the names of the countries in each group according to the income
categories defined by the World Bank (high income, upper middle income and middle income).
All 22 advanced economies are in the high per capita income group. Of the 61 developing
countries, 18 of them are in the high income, 30 are in the upper middle income and 13 are in
the middle income group.
World Bank regulation surveys are carefully executed. Surveys were sent to senior officers
5I use the recently compiled panel data from responses to all four surveys by the same authors. See Barth
et al. (2013) for an extensive discussion of this panel data set.
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in the main regulatory agency in each country and whenever there are conflicting or confusing
answers to questions, authors double-checked the information by contacting regulators in the
corresponding country and also by referring to other sources including the information collected
by Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Institute of International Bankers
(Barth et al., 2004).
Barth et al. (2004) defines the “Overall Capital Stringency” index as “whether the capital
requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value losses from capital
before minimum capital adequacy is determined”. The index is originally based on the responses
to seven questions in the Capital Regulatory Variable section of the surveys. In this study, I
create the index using six of the seven questions. These six questions are given in Table 2.1
below.6 A value of one is assigned to each “yes” answer, and a value of zero is assigned to
each “no” answer. Therefore, the index takes values between 0 and 6, and higher values of the
index correspond to greater stringency of bank capital regulations.
The six questions used in the creation of the index are derived from Basel bank capital
adequacy principles. The questions in Table 2.1 can be considered in two broad groups. The
first group of questions (3.1.1, 3.2 and 3.3) measure a country’s compliance with Basel risk
guidelines, and the second group of questions concern the calculation of capital. Basel capital
adequacy ratio is equal to the equity capital divided by risk weighted assets. Therefore, the
first group of questions concern the determination of the weights in the denominator of the
capital ratio whereas the second group of questions deal with the determination of capital in
the numerator of this ratio. Hence, countries’ stance on these issues determine their effective
minimum capital adequacy ratio. A country might have 10% minimum capital ratio, which is
above the Basel recommended value of 8%, but if the country is quite lenient on what banks
can include in regulatory capital or how they determine risk weights, the effective capital ratio
will actually be lower. Therefore, this index gives us a measure of stringency of bank capital
regulations that is comparable across countries and over time.
Figure B.1 shows the distribution of overall capital stringency index for each survey. The
6I exclude the following question from the calculation of the index: “What fraction of revaluation gains is
allowed as part of capital?”. First, the answers to this question are not as objective as the answers to other six
questions and quantification of those answers poses serial challenges. Second, including this question severely
reduces the data availability.
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Table 2.1: Capital Stringency Index Questions
3.1.1 Is the minimum capital ratio risk weighted in line with the Basle guidelines? Yes/No
3.2 Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of an individual bank’s credit risk? Yes/No
3.3 Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? Yes/No
3.9 Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the following are deducted
from the book value of capital?
3.9.1 Market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? Yes/No
3.9.2 Unrealized losses in securities portfolios? Yes/No
3.9.3 Unrealized foreign exchange losses? Yes/No
figure reveals that there is a significant variation in the stringency of bank capital regulations
across countries for each of the four survey years. The mean of the index for each survey
years are 3.34, 3.51, 3.42, and 5.27 with standard deviations of 1.61, 1.47, 1.71 and 1.32,
respectively. The percantage of countries with an index value that is below the mean is 47% in
1999, 39% in 2002, 55% in 2006 and 24% in 2011. The average capital stringency index rises by
a significant amount after the global recession, and its standard deviation shrinks, however the
cross-country variation does not disappear. Figure B.1 shows that after the global recession,
the distribution becomes significantly skewed to the right indicating that there is an overall
increase in the stringency of capital regulations around the world.
Figure B.2 shows that there is also a significant variation in the stringency of bank cap-
ital regulations over time. Each panel shows the distribution of the change in the capital
stringency index for for individual countries compared to the previous survey (i.e. the distri-
bution of capital stringencyit − capital stringencyi,t−1). Strikingly the direction of the change
in capital regulations is not positive for all countries over time. Among 61 countries that
responded to both 2002 and 1999 surveys, 10(17%) countries reduced the stringency of capital
regulations compared to the previous survey, whereas 33(53%) countries kept the regulation
level the same, and 19(30%) countries strengthened their regulations. A larger percentage of
countries relaxed their regulatory standards between 2002 and 2006. Among 61 countries that
responded to both 2002 and 2006 surveys, 19(31%) countries relaxed the stringency of capital
regulations compared to the previous survey whereas 19(31%) countries kept the regulation
level the same, and 23(38%) countries strengthened their regulations. The distribution changes
significantly after the recent financial crisis and it becomes right skewed. Among 60 countries
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that responded the last two surveys, only 6(10%) of them reduced the stringency of capital
regulations, 13(22%) of them kept the regulation at the same level whereas 41(68%) countries
increased the stringency of bank capital regulations.
2.3.1 Discussion of variables
Table B.2 summarizes the dependent variable, main independent variables, and legal origin
control variables. It is striking that capital regulation index has a higher within variation than
between variation. In other words, in our sample the stringency of capital regulations varies
more over time for a given country than it varies across countries in a given year. This fact
suggests the use of panel data methods as an estimation strategy. In particular, using fixed
effect estimation that is mainly identified through within variation will be the natural choice.
There are three main explanatory variables derived from the previous theoretical and em-
pirical literature which was reviewed in the introduction. I use three year average real GDP
growth rates as a proxy for the average return to investment in Kara (2013) who predicts that
high return countries choose less stringent capital regulations.7 GDP growth rate is a good
proxy for average returns of assets in an economy, and it is the most important benchmark
for an economy that policy makers base decisions upon. GDP growth rate data is more easily
available for a large number of countries and much less volatile than some other measure of
average returns such as stock market returns. Furthermore, there are many under-capitalized
developing countries in our sample, and GDP growth rate is more representative of overall
average returns than the stock market gains for this group. I obtain GDP growth rate data
from the World Development Indicator’s database of the World Bank. Similar to the capital
stringency index, within country variation in average growth rate is considerably higher than
between country variation in our sample. I test if there is a negative relationship between the
stringency of capital regulations and real GDP growth rate as predicted by Kara (2013).
The second explanatory variable, government-owned banks is the percentage of banking
system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more government owned. This data is also obtained
from the World Bank regulation surveys. Table B.2 shows that the government ownership
7For example, for the second survey that represents the stance of capital regulations at the end of 2002 I use
average of growth rates for 2002, 2001 and 2000.
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of banks varies significantly across countries but it is relatively stable for a given country
over time. The ratio takes values between 0% and 80% in our sample. A closer look at the
data show that most advanced countries have very low to none government ownership in the
banking sector before the recent crisis.8 The last survey reveals that this ratio is increasing
for some advanced economies (Austria, Switzerland, UK, Ireland, Iceland, Netherlands) in the
aftermath of the global recession in most part due to nationalizations and bailouts.
I use fraction of government-owned banks as a proxy for regulatory capture. If a country
has high ratio of government-owned banks, then one would expect the regulator of the country
to be more concerned about the banking sector profits as opposed to financial stability, and
hence choose more lax regulations as suggested by Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006). Therefore,
I test if there is a negative relationship between the stringency of capital regulations and
government-owned banks.
The third explanatory variable is the 3-bank concentration ratio. This variable is obtained
from “Financial Institutions and Markets Across Countries and over Time: Data and Analy-
sis” database prepared by Thortsen Beck and Asli Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt (Beck and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt,
2012). The variable is the ratio of the assets of three largest banks to the assets of all commer-
cial banks in a country. The authors calculated this ratio from Fitch’s BankScope database. I
use two year averages of this data to smooth potential short term volatility in bank concentra-
tion mainly due to mergers and acquisitions.9 Table B.2 shows that concentration ratio varies
between 15.32% and 100%, and the between country variation is almost twice as much as the
within country variation in our sample.
The intensity of competition in the banking sector, which is usually measured by the in-
verse of the concentration ratio, has always been considered as one of the major determinants
of how much risk that banks want to take. Since a major motive for capital regulation is to
limit incentives to take excessive risks in the banking sector, this study includes concentration
8Germany, Portugal, Grece and Switzerland are exceptions in that regard with 40%, 25%, 23% and 11.5%
government-owned bank ratios respectively, according to the last figures before the crisis.
9For example, for the second survey that represents the stance of capital regulations at the end of 2002 I
use the average of bank concentration ratios in 2002 and 2001. I performed robustness checks using single year
values and 3-year averages but the coefficients or standard errors did not change significantly.
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ratio in the regressions. However, there are two conflicting theories on the relationship be-
tween concentration ratio and bank risk taking that are broadly discussed in the introduction.
A priori, this study does not take a particular side on this theoretical and empirical divide.
In the regressions of this study, a negative relationship between the stringency of bank capi-
tal regulations and concentration ratio will support the “concentration-stability” hypothesis,
whereas as positive relationship will support the “concentration-fragility” hypothesis.
Lastly, I control for institutional characteristics of countries in the pooled OLS regressions.
Barth et al. (2006) argue that institutional structure of a country largely impacts the objectives
of regulators and they provide strong empirical evidence that supports this argument. I use
legal origin dummies introduced by La Porta et al. (1998) to control for the institutional
background of a country. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that legal heritage differences across
countries is an important determinant of the degree of centralized government influence in the
financial system. Legal origin controls are also used in Barth et al. (2006) in regressions that
explain cross-country differences in overall bank regulations. Barth et al. (2006) provide the
following example to motivate the legal origin dummies: “ to the degree that British common
countries grant judges greater discretion and independence, this may influence the types of
regulations that are enacted and the ways in which the courts interpret and enact enforce
those regulations.” In Section 7, as a part of the robustness checks, I use other political and
institutional control variables.
2.3.2 Relationships between the variables
Table B.3 gives the pairwise correlation coefficients between the dependent variable, the main
explanatory variables (GDP growth, government-owned banks and concentration ratio), legal
origin dummies, and two categorical variables: emg is a dummy that equals 1 if the country
is an emerging economy, and 0 if the country is an advanced economy (using the classification
in Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012)); inc is a categorical variable that is equal to 1 if the
country is in the ‘high income’ group, 2 if in the ‘upper-middle income’ group, and 3 if in
the ‘middle income’ group. Table B.3 shows that capital stringency index has a significant
and negative correlation with the average GDP growth rates. Correlation of the index with
government-owned banks or with concentration ratio is negative but not statistically different
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from zero. The index is negatively and significantly correlated with the emerging country
dummy, indicating that emerging countries tend to have lower levels of capital regulation,
however there is no significant correlation between index and country income groups. There is
also no significant correlation between the capital stringency index and legal origin dummies.
Correlation of the emerging country dummy with other explanatory variables indicates
that emerging countries have higher average GDP growth rates and higher ratio of government
bank ownership in our sample. However, there is no indication from the correlation table that
emerging countries have more or less concentrated banking sectors compared to the advanced
economies. Nevertheless, concentration ratio has a significant negative correlation with income
groups, indicating that higher income countries have more concentrated banking sectors. Table
B.3 shows that higher income countries also tend to have lower government ownership of banks
and lower GDP growth rates in our sample.
Figure B.4 shows the mean of the capital stringency index for advanced and emerging
countries separately for each survey. In all surveys, the average capital stringency index for
the advanced economies is larger than the average for the emerging economies. The difference
is larger in 1999 and 2006 surveys. Following the world business cycle downturns in early 2000s
and late 2000s, the gap between advanced and emerging country capital regulations shrinks.
A t-test for the null hypothesis that the difference of the means for the advanced and emerging
country groups is equal to zero against the alternative that the difference is greater than zero
is rejected for 1999 and 2006 surveys, but it could not be rejected at the 10% level for 2002 and
2011 surveys. The mean of the index for the pooled sample is 4.20 and 3.77 for the advanced
and emerging countries respectively, and they are significantly different from each other. The
equality of means over all four surveys is rejected with a p-value of about 7%. I also perform
the Wilcoxon rank test for the equality of the medians for these two group of countries for the
pooled sample. The test significantly rejects the equality of medians with a p-value of about
2%.
The mean of the capital stringency index for all countries shows an interesting negative
correlation with the world business cycle trend. The mean of the index is 3.34, 3.51, 3.42,
and 5.27 respectively for the four surveys. A scatter plot of the mean of the capital stringency
index and 3-year average GDP growth rates shows this negative relationship clearly (see Figure
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B.3). Most remarkably, high growth rates of the first half of 2000s is followed by a relaxation
of average capital regulations, and the global recession of 2007-2009 is followed by a tightening
of capital regulations. The increase in the stringency of capital regulations happens for both
advanced and emerging countries after the great recession. This graph also indicates the effect
of a financial crisis on the behavior of the regulator: a recent strong financial crisis makes the
society and policy makers more concerned about the financial stability and hence empowers
regulators.
Table 2.2 provides another look at the relationship between the capital stringency and the
main independent variables. I divide stringency of capital regulations into three categories:
low, medium and high where ‘low’ corresponds to index values less than three, ‘medium’
corresponds to index values of three or four, and ‘high’ corresponds to index values of five
and six. Table 2 shows that higher stringency levels are associated with lower average growth
rates, lower government ownership of banks, and lower concentration ratios.
Table 2.2: Mean Values of Independent Variables for Regulation Categories
Level of Capital Stringency
Low Medium High
GDP Growth 3.89 3.83 2.68
Government-owned banks 19.28 18.51 13.33
Concentration ratio 60.02 58.69 57.99
2.4 Methodology
This study estimates the following panel data specification
CSit = β1Rit + β2GBit + β3Conit + γXit + αi + it (2.1)
where time variable (t) denotes survey years, and cross-sectional index (i) denotes countries.
The dependent variable is the standardized value of the capital stringency index. I use the
standardized value of the index in order to obtain the effects of independent variables in terms
of standard deviations of the stringency of capital regulations. This transformation does not
effect the qualitative results, but brings a more natural and intuitive interpretation to the
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coefficients given the discrete nature of dependent variable.
Rit is 3-year average real GDP growth rate which is a proxy for overall asset returns, GBit
is government-owned banks which is the percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that
are 50% or more government owned and it is a proxy for the regulatory capture: the degree
to which regulators are captured by the financial institutions under their control. Conit is
the three-bank concentration ratio which indirectly captures the risk taking incentives in the
banking sector, and lastly Xit will be control variables such as institutional structure in some
specifications.
Fixed effects model is the natural choice for estimation of this model for a couple of reasons.
First, it is quite likely that unobserved country-specific heterogeneity, caputred by αi terms,
is correlated with the regressors Rit, GBit and Conit. Fixed effects model yields consistent
estimates of the model parameters under this type of correlation. Secondly, the fixed effects
model is mainly identified through over time (within) variation in the data because the model
is estimated after transforming each variable by subtracting time-average for each country
from the original variable. For that reason, the fixed effects model is also called the within
model. In our sample, the within variation dominates the between variation for the dependent
variable and GDP growth rates. There is also a significant amount of within variation in the
two other main explanatory variables. Third, the fixed effects model is recommended when
the sample is an exhaustive list of the population (mostly occurs in cross-country studies such
as ours) rather than a random draw from a large population (mostly occurs when individuals
from a large population are sampled). Since our sample is an exhaustive list of all systemically
important countries in the world, the third criteria also points to the use of fixed effects model.
The fixed effect model assumes that it ∼ IID(0, σ2 ), and considers αi’s as fixed parameters
that can be estimated along side with other parameters. The within transformation eliminates
any variables that do not change over time, including αi terms and other observed country spe-
cific characteristics such as the institutional characteristics including legal origin, government
type etc.
Even though, the fixed effects model appears as the natural choice for our sample, I still
estimate the model using pooled OLS regression (with clustered standard errors) for compar-
ison. The results are presented in the next section. Although not reported, I also performed
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a random effects estimation. The random effect estimation is inconsistent if regressors are
correlated with country fixed effects. I use Hausman test to check the validity of this assump-
tion. The null hypothesis is that regrossors are uncorrelated with unobserved country level
heterogeneity. Under the null, the random effects model is consistent and it is the efficient
estimator. Hausman test strongly rejects the null hypothesis indicating that the random ef-
fects coefficients are inconsistent in our sample. In other words, Hausman test adds a fourth
justification to the choice of the fixed effects model as the main estimation strategy in this
study.
2.5 Results
Table 2.3 presents the estimation of the model given by Equation (2.1). The first and second
columns are the pooled OLS estimation where errors are clustered over countries to account
for possible within country serial correlation in the combined error term αi + it. The second
column includes country legal origin dummies to control for the institutional background of
the economy.
The focus of this study is on the fixed effects model given by column three as discussed
in the previous section, but still I present the pooled OLS estimations for comparison. The
fixed effect models predict a strongly significant and negative effect of all three variables on
the stringency of bank capital regulations.10 The negative coefficient on the GDP growth
variable provides empirical support to the theoretical result in Kara (2013). He shows that
high return countries choose less stringent bank capital regulations because higher returns
allow a country to take on more risk through less stringent regulations. The fixed effects model
estimates that one percentage point increase in the GDP growth rate reduces the stringency
of capital regulation by 8.3% standard deviation. This coefficient is not only statistically
highly significant, but it is also economically meaningful. The following exercise helps us to
see the economic significance of the coefficient: what would be the necessary change in the
GDP growth rate for an emerging country to have the capital stringency level of an advanced
country? The mean of the standardized index is 0.18 for the advanced countries, and it is
10The legal origin dummies disappear in the fixed effects estimation, because any time invariant variable is
eliminated due to the within transformation.
62
-0.07 for the emerging countries. Therefore, the difference between the two means is equal
to 0.25 standard deviation and a t-test shows that it is statistically greater than zero. The
coefficient on the GDP growth variable implies that, everything else constant, if emerging
countries had 3 percentage points lower GDP growth rate, they would choose the same level of
bank capital stringency as the developed countries (0.25/0.083 ' 3). A larger and economically
more significant effect is obtained when a dynamic model is estimated in the next section.
Table 2.3: Results for the Statics Model
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
GDP growth -0.067*** -0.069*** -0.083***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000)
Government-owned banks -0.004 -0.003 -0.020***
(0.334) (0.388) (0.002)
Concentration ratio -0.003 -0.003 -0.019**
(0.424) (0.414) (0.013)
Legal origin UK -0.046
(0.912)
Legal origin FR -0.221
(0.568)
Legal origin GE -0.157
(0.690)
Constant 0.419* 0.584 1.657***
(0.097) (0.268) (0.000)
Observations 246 245 246
R-squared 0.058 0.066 0.171
Number of code 81
1 The dependent variable is the standardized value of the capital stringency index.
The range of the standardized index is [−2.25, 1.22]. For the pooled OLS regres-
sions, standard errors are clustered at the country level to take into account the
highly likely within country correlation in error terms.
2 GDP growth, government-owned banks and concentration ratio are expressed in
percentages. For example, three percent real GDP growth rate is expressed as 3.0
in our data.
3 GDP growth is 3 year average growth rate for years t, t− 1 and t− 2 whereas the
capital stringency index represents the state of the capital regulation the end of
year t.
4 Legal origin variables are dummies that do not change over time, and hence they
are dropped in the fixed effect regressions as a result of the within transformation.
5 p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The negative coefficient on government-owned banks supports the theoretical prediction in
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006). They show that if a regulator is more concerned about the
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banking sector profits as opposed to the financial stability, it will choose less stringent capital
regulations. I use government ownership of banks as a proxy for the weight on bank profits
in a regulator’s objective function. The fixed effects results show that one percentage point
increase in government ownership of banks ratio leads to 2% standard deviation decrease in the
stringency of bank capital regulations. Using the same exercise from the previous paragraph,
the coefficient implies that, everything else constant, if emerging countries had 12.5 percentage
points lower government-owned bank ratios, they would choose the same level of bank capital
stringency as the developed countries (0.25/0.02 ' 12.5). Since government ownership of banks
varies between 0% and 80% in our sample, the estimated effect is economically reasonable in
addition to being statistically highly significant.
Lastly, the negative coefficient on concentration ratio shows that regulators relax strin-
gency of bank capital regulations as the banking sector becomes more concentrated. This could
happen if the regulators tend to associate higher concentration ratio with less incentives for
excessive risk taking in the banking sector. Therefore, the result supports the “concentration-
stability” hypothesis in the long theoretical and empirical divide about the effect of concen-
tration in the banking sector on financial stability. The fixed effects result shows that one
percentage point increase in the concentration ratio reduces the stringency of capital regula-
tions by 1.9% standard deviations. Again let us ask: what would be the necessary change in
concentration ratio for an emerging country to have the capital stringency level of an advanced
country? The coefficient implies that, everything else constant, if emerging countries had 13
percentage points lower concentration ratio, they would choose the same level of bank capital
stringency as the developed countries. (0.25/0.019 ' 13). This effect is also economically
meaningful given that the concentration ratio varies between 15% and 100% in our sample.
Estimating a pooled OLS model increases standard errors significantly: government-owned
banks and concentration ratio become insignificant whereas the p-value of GDP growth rises
from 0.000 to 0.004. However, the pooled OLS results are inconsistent if the independent
variables are correlated with fixed country effects, which is quite likely in this setup. I provide
them here only for comparative reasons. Also, the second column in Table 2.3 shows that none
of the legal origin dummies have a significant effect on the stringency of capital regulations.
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2.6 Dynamic Model
It could very well be argued that regulatory choices contain some degree of inertia. Regulators
may not want to make large changes in the stringency of capital regulations at once in order
to not to cause a large and uncontrollable reaction in markets. They may also face political
pressure or difficulties as they try to change regulation levels. Even more, they may not know
how to best react to changing economy dynamics and choose simply to do nothing. Actually,
Figure B.2 shows that in each survey a large fraction of countries keep the stringency of
capital regulations the same compared to the last survey. In order to capture this highly
possible inertia in capital regulations I introduce the following dynamic model:
CSit = β0CRi,t−1 + β1R¯it + β2GBit + β3Conit + γXit + αi + it (2.2)
where it ∼ IID(0, σ2 ).
The only difference of the dynamic model from the static model given by Equation (2.1)
is the introduction of the lagged dependent variable, CSi,t−1, on the right hand side as an
explanatory variable. However, this seemingly small change requires a significant alteration
of the estimation technique. The within transformation or taking the first difference will not
eliminate the endogeneity issue, and hence fixed effect model will yield inconsistent parameter
estimates for the dynamic model. In order to see that, consider the equation in the first-
difference form below
∆CSit = β0∆CSi,t−1 + β1∆R¯it + β2∆GBit + β3∆Conit + γ∆Xit + ∆it (2.3)
Here the error term ∆it is correlated with ∆CSi,t−1 among the right hand side variables
because i,t−1 in ∆it is correlated with CSi,t−1 in ∆CSi,t−1. Therefore, Equation (2.3) can
only be consistently estimated with appropriate set of instruments that are correlated with
the endogenous regressor ∆CSi,t−1, but not correlated with the error term, ∆it. Arellano
and Bond (1991) show that CSi,t−s for s ≥ 2 are uncorrelated with ∆it and can be used as
instruments. Similarly, if there is any other endogenous variable among regressors, second and
higher order lags of that variable can be included in the instrument set. When a regressor is
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predetermined but not strictly exogenous, its lagged values of order one or higher are valid
instruments. If the regressor is strictly exogenous, then current and all lagged values are valid
instruments. This estimation technique is also called the Difference GMM estimation.
Arellano and Bover (1995) argue that efficiency of dynamic panel data estimation by the
Difference GMM method can significantly be improved if the equation in levels (given by 2.2)
is estimated along side with the equation in first difference (given by 2.3). They show that
the lags of the difference variables can be used as instruments for the level equation. This
augmented estimator is called the System-GMM estimator.
Estimation of the dynamic model is given by Table 2.4. The first two columns are the
Difference GMM estimator and the last two column are estimated using the System GMM.
All four specifications are estimated using a two-step procedure where the first step results
used to calculate the optimal weighting matrix for the second step estimation. Windmeijer
(2005) corrected robust standard errors for the two-step GMM estimation is used in all four
specifications.
The first and third columns are estimated under the assumption that all three regressors
are strictly exogenous with respect to the time varying heterogeneity (it), and the second and
fourth columns are estimated under the assumption that GDP growth and concentration ratio
are predetermined variables, i.e that the error term it is uncorrelated with the current and
lagged values of these regressors, but it can be correlated with future values of the regressors.
In other words, estimations in columns two and four allow time varying shocks to regulatory
standards to effect future GDP growth rates, and concentration ratios but not government-
owned banks. I believe that this is a more reasonable assumption than treating these variables
strictly exogenous. It is a well known fact the regulatory choices might affect future GDP
growth rates. There is also a large literature examining the effects of capital regulations on
the banking sector performance and riskiness, which could eventually impact the concentration
in the sector. Note that all specifications still allow regressors to be correlated with country
specific time-unvarying heterogeneity captured by αi terms which are eliminated by the first
difference transformation.
I use the standardized value of the capital stringency index as in the static model estima-
tions presented in the previous section. Treating GDP growth and government-owned banks
66
Table 2.4: Results for the Dynamic Model
Difference GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.Capital stringency 0.351 0.298 0.075 0.090
(0.468) (0.365) (0.741) (0.616)
GDP growth -0.146*** -0.194*** -0.141*** -0.184***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Government-owned banks -0.016 -0.023 -0.019 -0.021
(0.367) (0.159) (0.289) (0.191)
Concentration ratio -0.007 0.008 -0.010 -0.011
(0.647) (0.706) (0.394) (0.396)
Constant 1.333 0.705 1.538* 1.764**
(0.196) (0.565) (0.094) (0.037)
Observations 86 86 161 161
Number of code 52 52 72 72
1 The dependent variable is the standardized value of the capital stringency index. The
range of the standardized index is [−2.25, 1.22].
2 Column (1): Two-step GMM estimation where all three right-hand side variables are
treated as strictly exogenous with respect to time-varying heterogeneity it. Column
(2): Two-step GMM estimation where GDP growth and concentration ratio are treated
as predetermined variables with respect to time-varying heterogeneity it. Columns (3)-
(4) repeat the estimations in Column (1) and (2) with Two-Step System GMM where
levels Equation (2.2) is estimated along side with the first difference model given by
Equation (2.3).
3 GDP growth, government-owned banks and concentration ratio are expressed in per-
centages.
4 GDP growth is 3 year average growth rate for years t, t − 1 and t − 2 whereas the
capital stringency index represents the state of the capital regulation the end of year t.
5 Standard errors are Windmeijer corrected robust. p values in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
as predetermined variables as opposed to strictly exogenous variables significantly reduces the
standard errors for all coefficients and increases the estimated magnitudes of the coefficients.
This suggests that columns two and four are better specifications for the model of this study
as expected. Therefore I focus on the results in these columns.
Estimation with dynamic panel data models conserve the signs obtained with the static
fixed effects model for GDP growth and government-owned banks. The coefficient of GDP
growth is estimated even with a higher precision than static models. It is significant at 1% level
in all four specifications. The coefficient of concentration ratio becomes positive in the System
GMM estimations given in the last two columns, however it is not statistically different from
zero in any dynamic model estimation. The coefficient of government-owned banks also turns
67
out to be insignificant in these dynamic model estimations. However, when we use the levels
of the index instead of the standardized values, this coefficient becomes quite significant when
GDP growth and concentration ratio are treated as predetermined variables (as in columns
two and four in Table 2.4). The first difference and System GMM estimations using the levels
of the index, which are not reported here, provides p-values of 1.2% and 9.8%, respectively for
the government-owned banks variable.
Accounting for the potential inertia in the capital regulation index significantly increases
the magnitude of the coefficient for GDP growth compared to the static fixed effects model
presented in Table 2.3. I repeat the exercise that was performed in the previous section in order
to gauge the economic significance of the estimated coefficient. The dynamic model estimates
that if the emerging countries had only 1.3 percentage points less average GDP growth rate (as
opposed to 3 percentage points in the static model), they would choose the same level of bank
capital stringency as the developed countries (0.25/0.189 ' 1.3) where 0.25 is the difference
between the means of the standardized index for these two country groups.11 Therefore, the
results with the dynamic model show a stronger economic impact of GDP growth rate on the
choice of the stringency of capital regulations than the static models.
The magnitude of the coefficient on government-owned banks does not change significantly
compared to the static model. The exercise shows that, under the dynamic model, if emerging
countries had 11.3 percentage points lower government ownership of banks ratio, they would
choose the same level of bank capital stringency as the developed countries (0.25/0.022 ' 11.3).
This number was 12.5 percentage points in the static model, which is quite close. The effect of
government-owned banks on the capital regulation stringency is economically meaningful, but
this effect is not statistically as strong as the effect of the GDP growth variable: coefficient
of government-owned banks is only significant under the fixed effects estimations, or when we
use the levels of the index in the dynamic model.
On the other hand, concentration ratio has no significant effect on the stringency of capital
regulation under the dynamic model whether we use the levels or the standardized value of the
index. In other words, the significant and negative coefficient for concentration ratio obtained
11I used the average of the estimated coefficients in columns two and four: (0.194 + 0.184)/2 = 0.189.
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in the static model is not robust to more reasonable specifications that come with dynamic
models. This is not very surprising given that the effect of concentration ratio on the stringency
of capital regulations can work both ways from a theoretical perspective.
2.7 Robustness
2.7.1 Principal Component Analysis
In the main section, I used the standardized value of the capital stringency index as the depen-
dent variable. Therefore, I implicitly assumed that all questions that enter into the calculation
of the index have equal waits in determining the stringency of bank capital regulation. How-
ever, some of the regulation dimensions measured by the index can more easily be adopted by
regulators and vary less across countries, whereas implementation of some other components
could be more challenging for regulators, and hence vary to a larger extent across countries.
For example, on average 99% of countries answered Question 3.1.1 (“Is the minimum capital
ratio risk weighted in line with the Basle guidelines?”) in Table 2.1 as “Yes”, whereas only
46% of them did so for Question 3.3 (“Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market
risk?”).
In that regard, one may prefer an index that attaches greater weights to components of
regulation that vary more across countries, and smaller weights to components vary less across
countries. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) exactly does that. Principal component
analysis is an orthogonal transformation of (possibly) correlated variables, the index compo-
nents here, into a number of linearly uncorrelated variables, called principal components. This
transformation is defined in such a way that the first principal component is the “most infor-
mative”, which means, it accounts for as much of the variability in the data as possible. The
first principal component in this case explains about 42% of the variation in the index data. I
estimate both the static and dynamic models using the first principal component of the capital
stringency index as the dependent variable. The results of the static model is presented in
Table 2.5. Again, my focus in on the fixed effects regression, but the pooled OLS estimation
results are presented for comparison. The results do not change qualitatively compared to the
results in Table 2.3 where the standardized value of the index is used. The fixed effects model
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Table 2.5: Results for the Statics Model with Principal Component Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
GDP growth -0.072* -0.076** -0.091**
(0.058) (0.048) (0.012)
Government-owned banks -0.006 -0.005 -0.029***
(0.413) (0.463) (0.008)
Concentration ratio -0.003 -0.004 -0.031***
(0.545) (0.452) (0.009)
Legal origin UK -0.149
(0.830)
Legal origin FR -0.377
(0.565)
Legal origin GE -0.231
(0.727)
Constant 0.643 0.972 2.719***
(0.107) (0.257) (0.000)
Observations 245 244 245
R-squared 0.030 0.038 0.130
Number of code 81
1 The dependent variable is the first principal component of the capital stringency
index. The range of the principal component is [−2.52, 1.78]. For the pooled OLS
regressions, standard errors are clustered at the country level to take into account
the highly likely within country correlation in error terms.
2 GDP growth, government-owned banks and concentration ratio are expressed in
percentages.
3 GDP growth is 3 year average growth rate for years t, t− 1 and t− 2 whereas the
capital stringency index represents the state of the capital regulation the end of
year t.
4 Legal origin variables are dummies that do not change over time, and hence they
are dropped in the fixed effect regressions as a result of the within transformation.
5 Robust p values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
estimates negative and significant effect of all three variables on the stringency of capital reg-
ulations. Given that the range of the principal component is [−2.52, 1.78] with mean 0.16 and
standard deviation 1.57, the economic magnitude of the coefficients are similar to the those
obtained in Table 2.3.
Table 2.6 presents the results of dynamic panel data models using Principal Component
Analysis. Similar to Table 2.4, the first and third columns are estimated under the assumption
that all three regressors are strictly exogenous with respect to the time varying heterogeneity
(it), and the second and fourth columns are estimated under the assumption that GDP growth
and concentration ratio are predetermined variables, i.e that the error term it is uncorrelated
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Table 2.6: Results for the Dynamic Model with Principal Component Analysis
Difference GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.capital stringency pc 0.122 0.140 0.021 0.109
(0.705) (0.512) (0.925) (0.503)
GDP growth -0.221*** -0.268*** -0.209*** -0.260***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Government-owned banks -0.018 -0.027 -0.022 -0.023
(0.498) (0.293) (0.461) (0.393)
Concentration ratio -0.015 0.014 -0.016 -0.014
(0.452) (0.675) (0.424) (0.567)
Constant 2.254 0.833 2.341 2.389
(0.121) (0.674) (0.117) (0.136)
Observations 86 86 161 161
Number of code 52 52 72 72
1 The dependent variable is the principal component of the capital stringency index. The
range of the principal component is [−2.52, 1.78] with mean 0.16 and standard deviation
1.57.
2 Column (1): Two-step GMM estimation where all three right-hand side variables are
treated as strictly exogenous with respect to time-varying heterogeneity it. Column (2):
Two-step GMM estimation where GDP growth and concentration ratio are treated as
predetermined variables with respect to time-varying heterogeneity it. Columns (3) and
(4) repeat the estimations in Column (1) and (2) with Two-Step System GMM where levels
Equation (2.2) is estimated along side with the first difference model given by Equation
(2.3).
3 GDP growth, government-owned banks and concentration ratio are expressed in percent-
ages.
4 GDP growth is 3 year average growth rate for years t, t− 1 and t− 2 whereas the capital
stringency index represents the state of the capital regulation the end of year t.
5 Standard errors are Windmeijer corrected robust. Robust p values in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
with the current and lagged values of these regressors, but it can be correlated with future
values of these regressors.
The coefficient of GDP Growth is highly significant across all specifications, and it is at
least twice as large as the coefficients estimated by static models. Coefficients of the two other
explanatory variables (government-owned banks and concentration ratio) and the lagged de-
pendent variable are not significantly different from zero. Those results are qualitatively the
same as the results obtained with the standardized value of the index in Table 2.4. Further-
more, the quantitative effects of the coefficients also do not change significantly when the first
principal component of the index is used.
In summary, the combined results in this section and the previous one show an economically
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meaningful and statistically highly significant negative effect of GDP growth rate on the strin-
gency of bank capital regulations. Government-owned banks has a significant negative effect
in static fixed effects models, but under more reasonable dynamic models, it is significant only
if the levels of the stringency index is used as the dependent variable. Statistical significance
of this coefficient is not robust to using the standardized value or the first principal component
of the capital stringency index. Lastly, concentration ratio has a significant negative effect
on the stringency of capital regulations in static models, but never has a significant effect in
dynamic models.
2.7.2 Controlling for Financial and Institutional Development
There are significant differences in the financial development level, and the institutional struc-
ture of the countries in our sample. Those difference might affect the design of capital regu-
lations and the way the regulations change over time. In this section, I control for financial
structure and institutional background variables. Most of the variables that measure structure,
size, depth and openness of financial sectors are obtained from the extensive panel data set
created by Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, the so-called the Financial
Structure Database (Beck et al., 2009). I make use of the Polity IV and Worldwide Governance
Indicators databases to gather information on the political and institutional structures. The
variable definitions in this section are also taken from the corresponding databases.
Controlling for the Financial Structure
I start by controlling for the size, depth and efficiency of financial markets. I perform only fixed
effects regressions in this section. The results are presented in Table 2.7. I add one control
at a time. The results in the main section do not change at all when we include controls for
the financial structure. However, most of the control variables have insignificant coefficients
in these regressions. In the first column I control for Liquid Liabilities to GDP which is a
traditional indicator of financial depth. It equals currency plus demand and interest-bearing
liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP. This is the broadest
available indicator of financial intermediation, since it includes all banks, bank-like and non-
bank financial institutions. Liquid Liabilities to GDP has a positive but insignificant coefficient.
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Table 2.7: Fixed Effects with Financial Structure Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP growth -0.082*** -0.081*** -0.067** -0.119*** -0.082***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000)
Government-owned
banks
-0.022*** -0.020*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.020***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)
Concentration ratio -0.018** -0.015* -0.022*** -0.019** -0.018**
(0.030) (0.077) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014)
Liquid liabilities / GDP 0.007
(0.233)
Bank credit / Bank de-
posits
0.004**
(0.010)
Structure-size -0.188
(0.127)
Capital controls 0.001
(0.985)
Financial openness -0.005
(0.961)
Constant 1.181* 0.897 2.040*** 1.844*** 1.659***
(0.079) (0.113) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 224 233 215 225 245
1 The dependent variable is the standardized value of the capital stringency index. The range of the
standardized index is [−2.25, 1.22].
2 GDP growth, government-owned banks and concentration ratio are expressed in percentages. For
example, three percent real GDP growth rate is expressed as 3.0 in our data.
3 GDP growth is 3 year average growth rate for years t, t−1 and t−2 whereas the capital stringency
index represents the state of the capital regulation the end of year t.
4 p values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Theoretical studies on bank capital regulations generally assume that the savings of the
economy is turned into socially profitable investments through the intermediation of the fi-
nancial sector. In particular, studies from which some of the main explanatory variables are
derived, namely Kara (2013), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), Acharya (2001) consider such
models. In practice, there are large cross-country differences in the efficiency of banking sectors
in turning society’s savings into profitable investments as documented by Beck et al. (2009).
I use Bank Credit to Bank Deposits to control for the differences in the banking sector
efficiency. This variable is equal to the claims on the private sector to deposits in deposit money
banks. It measures the extent to which banks intermediate society’s savings into private sector
credits. Beck et al. (2009) show that financially less developed countries attract relatively less
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deposits into banks and they turn a smaller share of these deposits into private sector credits.
This ratio can essentially take values above one to indicate that private sector lending is funded
also with non-deposit sources. The ratio does indeed take values greater than one for about a
half of our sample. Results in the second column show that bank capital regulations become
stricter as the Bank Credits to Bank Deposits ratio increases. In other words, the stringency
of capital regulation is higher in countries with more efficient banking sectors.
In the third column I control for the financial structure using Structure-Size which equals
the Stock Market Capitalization to GDP divided by Bank Credit to GDP. Structure-Size com-
pares the total shares outstanding in the economy’s stock exchanges to the size of the banking
system. Thus, higher values of the indicator corresponds to more market based systems as
opposed bank based systems. The variable has a negative coefficient which would indicate
that more market based systems tend to have less stringent capital regulations, however this
coefficient is not statistically different from zero at conventional significance levels.
In the last two columns I control for the degree of financial openness. Financially open
countries have larger exposures to shocks coming from other countries, therefore they may have
stronger incentives to set strict capital regulations. I use two indicators of financial openness.
Capital Controls is obtained from the Economic Freedom of the World database. The index
is calculated based on the 13 types of international capital controls included the International
Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. The
zero-to-ten rating is the percentage of capital controls not levied as a share of the total number
of capital controls listed multiplied by 10. Therefore, higher values of this index corresponds
to less controls on capital and hence to a greater degree of financial openness. The second
indicator, Financial Openness, is also called the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN) (Chinn and Ito,
2006). This index is again based on the same IMF report, but it has a relatively more complex
construction that focuses more on financial openness than controls. The index takes higher
values the more open the country to cross-border capital transactions. The coefficient of these
two different measures of financial openness turn out to be the opposite in the regressions,
however neither of them is statistically different than zero. Therefore, I do not find evidence
that financially more open countries impose stricter capital regulations.
To sum, the results in Table 2.7 show that the findings in the main section are robust to
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controlling for differences in financial structure. In general, I find that the size of the banking
system relative to the size of the economy is positively associated with the stringency of capital
regulations although that relationship is not statistically significant. Second, the stringency of
capital regulation is higher in countries with more efficient banking sectors. Third, the stock
market capitalization and its relative size to the banking sector is negatively associated with
the stringency of capital regulations while the relationship is again insignificant. Lastly, the
degree of financial openness has no statistically significant effect on the stringency of capital
regulations.
Controlling for the Institutional and Political Background
Barth et al. (2006) show that international differences in institutional and political structure
influence the choice of bank regulatory and supervisory policies such as activity restrictions for
banks, entry requirements to the banking sector, the strength of private monitoring, and the
powers of the official banking supervisors. They do not bring forward any theoretical argument
or empirical evidence about the influence of political and institutional structure on bank capital
regulations in particular. Still, in this section, I control for political and institutional structure
variables for their potential effect on the stringency of bank capital regulations. I mainly use
the same institutional control variables that are used by Barth et al. (2006) in their regressions
in addition to few other indicators from commonly used databases. These indicators measure
the degree to which the political system is an open, competitive democracy that is accountable
to the broad population as opposed to being an autocratic regime that is only responsible to
a small group of leaders.
Four of the five institutional control variables are taken from the Polity IV Database. These
controls are Executive Constraints, Executive Competition, Executive Openness and Polity.
The first three are used by Barth et al. (2006) as well. Executive Constraints measures “the
extent to which institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief execu-
tives, whether individuals or collectivities”. The index varies from 1 to 7, where large values
correspond to greater constraints on executive power. Executive Competition refers to “the
extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become
superordinates.” It varies from 0 to 3, where higher values imply greater competition for the
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executive position. Executive Openness captures if “the recruitment of the chief executive is
‘open’ to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in princi-
ple, to attain the position through a regularized process.” This index takes values between
0 and 4, where higher values indicate greater openness. Polity measures the extent to which
the political system is democratic. It ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly
autocratic).
Table 2.8: Fixed Effects Estimation with Institutional and Political Structure Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
xconst xrcomp xropen polity rlest
VARIABLES ocns ocns ocns ocns ocn
GDP growth -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.141***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Government-owned banks -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.034***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.003)
Concentration ratio -0.016** -0.016** -0.016** -0.016** -0.032**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.014)
Executive constraints 0.005
(0.677)
Executive competition 0.005
(0.677)
Executive openness 0.005
(0.644)
Polity 0.001
(0.916)
Rule of law 0.175
(0.831)
Constant 1.465*** 1.479*** 1.472*** 1.482*** 6.645***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 240 240 240 240 246
R-squared 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.146 0.170
Number of code 79 79 79 79 81
1 The dependent variable is the standardized value of the capital stringency index. The range of the
standardized index is [−2.25, 1.22].
2 GDP growth, government-owned banks and concentration ratio are expressed in percentages. For
example, three percent real GDP growth rate is expressed as 3.0 in our data.
3 GDP growth is 3 year average growth rate for years t, t− 1 and t− 2 whereas the capital stringency
index represents the state of the capital regulation the end of year t.
4 p values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The last indicator, Rule of Law is taken from the World Governance Indicators Database.
Rule of Law “captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide
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by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” In our sample, Rule
of Law ranges from a low of -1.63 to a high of 1.99. The mean is 0.47 with a standard deviation
of 0.97. Based on data in 2011, some countries have political systems characterized by having
very low levels of rule of law such as Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela. On the other hand, rule
of law applies strongly in many countries including the US, UK, Iceland, New Zealand and
Singapore.
Barth et al. (2006) argue that open, competitive and democratic political systems will sup-
port banking regulations that maximize the welfare of society at large. However, when it comes
to bank capital regulations in particular, the level of stringency that maximize the welfare may
not be the most stringent regulations at all times for all countries. For example, Kara (2013)
shows that high return countries optimally choose less stringent capital regulations. There-
fore, the theory does not necessarily predicts a positive relationship between more democratic
political systems and the stringency of capital regulations. I obtain positive coefficients for
all of the political system indicators in the regressions presented in Table 2.8. However, none
of the coefficients for these controls is significantly different from zero confirming the lack of
direct influence of the political structure on the design of bank capital regulations.
2.8 Extensions
2.8.1 Logit Regressions for Individual Index Questions
In previous sections I used an aggregate index to measure the stringency of capital regulations.
The index is aggregated either by summing the values of individual questions, which implicitly
attached the same weight to all questions, or by using the principal component analysis, which
attaches greater weights to questions that vary more across countries and over time. In this
section, I analyze how the individual questions that make up the aggregate index changes with
the main independent variables. This analysis helps us go into the ‘black box’ of the aggregate
index and see which questions mainly differentiate across countries and drive the results that
were obtained in the previous sections.
The dependent variables in this section are the individual index questions that are presented
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in Table 2.1. Since the dependent variables are binary (take values either 0 or 1), I use logistic
regressions (logit) in this section. The unobserved country-specific heterogeneity is still highly
likely to be correlated with the explanatory variables. The consistent estimator in this case is
the conditional fixed effects logit model. Population averaged logit and pooled logit regressions
are performed for comparison. These two model results should be viewed with caution because
under the presence of fixed effects they are inconsistent.
The results are presented in Table B.4. The top panel presents the results of the conditional
fixed effects logit model, the middle panel presents population averaged logit and the last
panel presents the pooled logit model results. I will focus on the results in the top panel.
The conditional fixed effects logit model is identified through within (over time) variation.
Therefore, the estimation technique drops the countries from the sample for which the index
answers do not change over time.
There is so little over-time variation for the first question (“Is the minimum capital ratio
risk weighted in line with the Basle guidelines?”) for the majority of the countries. 78 countries
are dropped from the sample for the conditional fixed effects estimation of this question, and
hence observations from only 3 countries are used. The result in column one shows that
the coefficients of all three independent variables are negative but they are not statistically
different from zero. The result is quite expected. The independent variables do not cause any
significant effect in differentiating the answers to this question because there is not enough
variation in the answers to differentiate.
There is sufficient variation in the remaining five questions which can be seen from the fact
that they are estimated using the majority of the countries in the sample. The “number of
code” row shows how many countries were used to estimate the coefficients for each regression.
The coefficient of GDP growth is negative for all remaining five questions, but is is only
significantly different than zero for the second, third and fourth questions. It is actually barely
significant at 10% for the fourth question (“Does the market value of loan losses not realized in
accounting books deducted from the book value of capital before minimum capital adequacy
is determined?”), whereas it is significant even at 1% level for the second and third questions.
Therefore, the fixed effects logit regression shows that the negative and significant coefficient
of GDP growth in the aggregated index regressions in the previous sections is mainly driven by
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these two questions which concern if the minimum capital adequacy ratio varies as a function
of an individual bank’s credit risk and market risk.
The coefficient of concentration ratio is also negative for all six questions, but it is significant
only for the last three questions that deal with the determination of capital. The result
indicates that the negative and significant sign of concentration ratio in the aggregated index
fixed effects regressions is driven by the variation in answers to these last three questions.
Countries with more concentrated banking sectors are more lenient in the way banks are
allowed to calculate the equity capital (the numerator of the capital ratio).
The third main explanatory variable, government-owned banks, negatively effects the prob-
ability of a country answering ‘yes’ to any of the six questions as well. The coefficient of this
variable is significant only for the second, third and fourth questions similar to the GDP
growth variable. Higher government ownership of banks significantly reduces the proabilty
that a country allows the minimum capital adequacy ratio to vary with individual bank’s
credit risk and market risk, and the probability that the country requires loan losses not re-
alized in accounting books to be deducted from the book value of capital before minimum
capital adequacy is determined.
Population averaged and pooled logit models results are quite similar to each other. They
estimate negative and significant effect of GDP growth on the first question as well in addition
to the second, third and fourth questions. However, these two methods do not find any
significant effect of concentration ratio and government-owned banks on the probability that
countries answer ‘yes’ to any of the six questions. These results have to viewed by caution as
they are inconsistent under the presence of country fixed effects, which are very likely in this
setup.
2.8.2 Estimation of Different Slopes for Advanced and Emerging Countries
The regressions above assumed that the coefficients for the three explanatory variables are the
same across advanced and emerging countries. In this section, I estimate the fixed effect model
with interaction terms between the explanatory variables and a dummy for advanced countries
(dummy variable is equal to one for advanced countries and zero for emerging countries). The
results of this estimation is given in Table B.5. First, the fixed effects model is estimated by
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adding an interaction term and one of the right hand side variables once at a time. The column
four adds interaction terms between all right hand side variables and the advanced dummy.
The interaction terms allows estimating different slopes for advanced and emerging coun-
tries. The first three rows present the estimated coefficient of GDP growth, government-owned
banks and concentration ratio for emerging countries (that is when the dummy adv=0 ). The
signs are the same as the fixed effects estimation results in Table 2.3, but they are larger in
magnitude. Rows four to six show the coefficients of the interaction terms. Interaction terms
for GDP growth and government-owned banks are negative whereas the interaction terms for
concentration ratio is positive in all four specifications. However, none of the interaction terms
is statistically significant which means that the slopes for advanced and emerging countries
are not statistically different than each other.
The implied slopes for the advanced country group can be calculated by adding the inter-
action terms to the estimated slopes for the emerging country group given by the first three
rows. The resulting coefficients along with the p-values are presented in rows nine to eleven.
Slopes for GDP growth and government-owned Banks are larger in absolute value than the
slopes for emerging countries indicating that capital regulation in advanced countries are more
sensitive to changes in these independent variables than they are in emerging countries. Those
coefficients for advanced economies are statistically significant with p-values less than 2% on
their own. This result is reasonable because advanced countries have much lower growth rates
and government ownership of banks, and hence one percentage point change in these ratios
imply a larger change in terms of percentages of the original values compared to the emerging
countries.
The coefficient of concentration ratio is smaller in absolute value for advanced economies,
indicating that the capital regulation in advanced economies is responding less to changes
in concentration ratio. This could suggest that advanced country regulators expect smaller
changes in bank risk behavior as a result of changes in banking sector concentration. However,
neither the coefficient nor the difference between the estimates for the two country groups is
statistically different from zero for concentration ratio.
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2.9 Conclusion
Despite the extensive attention that the Basel capital adequacy standards received interna-
tionally, there exists significant variation in the implementation of these standards across
countries. Furthermore, a significant number of countries increase or decrease stringency of
capital regulations over time. In this chapter, I have investigated the empirical determinants
of the variation that is seen in the data based on the theories of bank capital regulation.
This study measures the stringency of capital regulations using an index created from
responses to the World Bank surveys on bank regulations. The capital stringency index shows
whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value
losses from capital before minimum capital adequacy is determined. The sample of this study
includes 83 major developed and developing countries. I have estimated static and dynamic
panel data models, and performed robustness tests using Principal Component Analysis.
The study provides strong evidence that countries with high average returns to investment
choose less stringent capital regulation standards. It also finds some evidence that capital
regulations are less stringent in countries with higher ratio of government ownership of banks:
government ownership of banks has a significant negative effect on the stringency of capital
regulations in the static fixed effects model, but under more reasonable dynamic models, it is
significant only if the levels of the capital stringency index is used as the dependent variable.
Statistical significance of this coefficient is not robust to using the standardized value or the
first principal component of the capital stringency index. Government ownership of banks is
used as a proxy for the regulatory capture: the degree to which regulators are captured by the
financial institutions under their control. Therefore, this result implies that the stringency of
capital regulations decrease in the regulatory capture. Lastly, the results provide somewhat
weaker evidence that countries with higher concentration in banking sectors impose less strict
capital standards: concentration ratio has a significant negative effect on the stringency of
capital regulations in static models, but never has a significant effect in dynamic models. A
negative relationship between the stringency of capital regulations and concentration ratio
would be obtained if regulators expect the banking sector to become more stable as it becomes
more concentrated.
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Appendix A
Examples and Proofs for Chapter 1
A.1 Functional Form Examples
Example 1 F (y) = R ln(1 + y)
For this return function we obtain the (inverse) demand function as
P = F ′(y) =
R
1 + y
and hence y = F ′−1(P ) =
R− P
P
≡ D(P ) (A.1.1)
This demand function is clearly downward slopping and convex as seen below
D′(P ) = − R
P 2
< 0 and D′′(P ) =
2R
P 3
> 0
F (·) satisfies Assumption CONCAVITY since
F ′′(y) = − R
(1 + y)2
< 0 and since F ′(0) = R
Let’s check whether this functional form satisfies the conditions given by Assumption ELAS-
TICITY and Assumption REGULARITY, respectively.
F ′(y) + yF ′′(y) =
R
1 + y
− y R
(1 + y)2
=
Ra
(1 + y)2
> 0
Clearly Assumption ELASTICITY is satisfied. Below we see that this function satisfies As-
sumption REGULARITY as well:
F ′(y)F ′′′(y)− 2F ′′(y)2 = R
(1 + y)
2R
(1 + y)3
− 2
(
R
(1 + y)2
)2
= 0
From above we can also see that this return function induces a log-convex demand function
since we will have F ′(y)F ′′′(y)− F ′′(y)2 > 0
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Example 2 F (y) =
√
y + a2
For this example the demand function will be obtained as
P = F ′(y) =
1
2
√
y + a2
and hence y = F ′−1(P ) =
1
4P 2
− a2 ≡ D(P )
This demand function is also downward slopping and convex as seen below
D′(P ) = − 1
2P 3
< 0 and D′′(P ) =
3
2P 4
> 0
Assumption CONCAVITY is satisfied since
F ′′(y) = − 1
4 (y + a)3/2
< 0 and F ′(0) = R implies that
1
2a
= R or a =
1
2R
We can easily show that Assumption ELASTICITY is satisfied:
F ′(y) + yF ′′(y) =
1
2 (y + a)
1
2
− y 1
4 (y + a)
3
2
=
y + 2a
4 (y + a)
3
2
> 0
Likewise we can show that this function satisfies Assumption REGULARITY as well:
F ′(y)F ′′′(y)− 2F ′′(y)2 = 1
2 (y + a)
1
2
3
8 (y + a)
5
2
− 2
(
1
4 (y + a)
3
2
)2
=
−1
16 (y + a)3
< 0
Note that in contrast to the first example this functional form induces a log-concave demand
function since we can show that F ′(y)F ′′′(y)− F ′′(y)2 < 0
A.2 Symmetric Countries: An example
In this section, I obtain closed form solutions for non-cooperative equilibrium regulation levels
and regulation levels under cooperative benchmark for the particular functional form choice
for the global investors’ technology given by Example 1 above.
For analytical convenience suppose that the technology of global investors is given by the
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following logarithmic function as investigated by Example 1 above
F (y) = A ln(a+ y) (A.2.1)
where the amount of assets the global investors optimally buy satisfies the following first order
conditions
F ′(y) =
A
a+ y
= P (A.2.2)
which will induce a downward slopping demand function
y = F ′(P )−1 =
A− aP
P
≡ D(P ) (A.2.3)
Imposing Assumption CONCAVITY on this functional form gives
F ′(0) = R⇒ A
a
= R or A = aR (A.2.4)
It is shown in the previous section that this functional form satisfies the conditions given
by Assumptions ELASTICITY and REGULARITY. Since this functional form satisfies all
sufficient conditions, we can proceed with solving for the equilibrium. We start solving the
model backwards as in the previous section. Therefore we first find the equilibrium price at
t = 1 using the market clearing condition.
D(P ) = S(P,NA +NB)⇒ A− aP
P
=
c(NA +NB)
P
(A.2.5)
Hence, we get the equilibrium price of assets at t = 1 as
P ∗ =
A− c(NA +NB)
a
(A.2.6)
which is clearly decreasing in the investment levels in both countries. Note also that equilibrium
price is determined only by the total investment level in the two countries. Exact division of
the total investment between the countries will not affect P ∗. This property of the equilibrium
price of assets is very helpful in the analysis of the model.
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We can also obtain equilibrium fraction of assets retained by banks after fire-sales as a
function of initial investment levels in each country by plugging the equilibrium price given by
equation (A.2.6) into equation (1.9) that defines this fraction as a ratio of market price, which
will give that
γ∗(NA, NB) = 1− c
P ∗(NA, NB)
= 1− ac
A− c(NA +NB) (A.2.7)
Remember that regulator i′s objective function is
max
Ni≥0
Wi(Ni, Nj) = q(R− 1)Ni + (1− q)[Rγ∗(Ni, Nj)Ni −Ni] (A.2.8)
Substituting for γ∗(Ni, Nj) from (A.2.7) gives
max
Ni≥0
Wi(Ni, Nj) = q(R− 1)Ni + (1− q)
[
R
(
1− ac
A− c(Ni +Nj)
)
Ni −Ni
]
(A.2.9)
where FOCs can be obtained as
∂Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
= qR+ (1− q)R
{
1− ac(A− cNj)
[A− c(Ni +Nj)]2
}
− 1 = 0 (A.2.10)
Solving for Ni gives the best response function of regulator i
N∗i (Nj) =
A− cNj −
√
σac(A− cNj)
c
(A.2.11)
where we define
σ ≡ (1− q)R
R− 1 (A.2.12)
We can use the best response functions to solve for the symmetric equilibrium investment
level. After some algebra we can obtain that for i = A,B
N̂i =
4A− σac−√8σAac+ (σac)2
8c
(A.2.13)
Note that by Assumption CONCAVITY we impose that A = aR. Substituting for A using
this identity gives
N̂i =
4R− σc−√8Rσc+ (σc)2
8c
(A.2.14)
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A.2.1 Central Regulation
Let’s consider the central regulator’s problem where the central regulator chooses the total
investment level in both countries.
max
N≥0
W (N) = q(R− 1)N + (1− q)[Rγ∗(N)N −N ] (A.2.15)
Denote the solution to this global problem by N. Central regulator will impose maximum
investment level in each country as N˜i = N/2 as discussed before. N will be characterized by
the FOCs of the problem above which we could derive as
∂W (N)
∂N
= qR+ (1− q)R
{
1− acA
(A− cN)2
}
− 1 = 0 (A.2.16)
Solving for N and substituting N˜i = N/2 gives the globally regulated investment level in each
country as
N˜i =
A−√σAac
2c
(A.2.17)
A.3 Proofs Omitted in the Text
A.3.1 Proofs for the Symmetric Countries Case
Lemma 1. P ∗(ni, nj) is decreasing in ni for i = A,B under Assumptions CONCAVITY and
ELASTICITY.
Proof. Applying the IFT on the MC condition gives
dP ∗
dni
= −∂E(·)/∂ni
∂E(·)/∂P =
∂S(P ∗, ni, nj)/∂ni
D′(P ∗)− ∂S(P ∗, ni, nj)/∂P (A.3.1)
First, note that using the expression for the total supply function given by (1.13) we obtain
∂S(·)
∂ni
=
c
P
> 0 (A.3.2)
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Hence, we can write the derivative in (A.3.1) as
dP ∗
dni
=
c
P ∗D′(P ∗)− P ∗ [∂S(P ∗, ni, nj)/∂P ] (A.3.3)
The following equivalence will help us to write this derivative using only return function of
global investors’ return function, F (·), and its derivatives
P ∗
∂S(P ∗, ni, nj)
∂P
= P ∗
−c(ni + nj)
P ∗2
=
−c(ni + nj)
P ∗
= −S(P ∗, ni, nj) (A.3.4)
Using this equivalence we can express the derivative given by (A.3.3) as
dP ∗
dni
=
c
P ∗D′(P ∗) + S(P ∗, ni, nj)
(A.3.5)
Let y∗ ≡ S(P ∗, ni, nj) denote the total volume of equilibrium fire-sales. In equilibrium we
will have P ∗ = F ′(y∗) from the demand curve. Therefore we can obtain
D′(P ∗) =
1
F ′′(y∗)
(A.3.6)
where we make use of the fact that D′(P ) ≡ F ′(P )−1 as given by (1.3). Hence, we can rewrite
the denominator of the expression (A.3.5) above as
P ∗D′(P ∗) + S(P ∗, ni, nj) =
F ′(y∗)
F ′′(y∗)
+ y∗ (A.3.7)
which we can write equivalently as
P ∗D′(P ∗) + S(P ∗, ni, nj) =
F ′(y∗) + y∗F ′′(y∗)
F ′′(y∗)
< 0 (A.3.8)
This expression is negative since F ′′(y) < 0 by Assumption CONCAVITY and
F ′(y) + yF ′′(y) > 0 (A.3.9)
by Assumption ELASTICITY . Therefore we conclude that dP ∗/dni < 0.
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Lemma 2. Equilibrium fraction of assets sold in each country, 1− γ∗(ni, nj), is increasing in
ni for i = A,B under Assumptions CONCAVITY and ELASTICITY.
Proof. Using (1.9) we can write banks’ asset sales in equilibrium as
1− γ∗(ni, nj) = c
P ∗(ni, nj)
(A.3.10)
Note that
∂γ∗
∂ni
=
∂γ∗
∂P ∗
dP ∗
dni
< 0 (A.3.11)
since δγ/δP = c/P 2 > 0 from (1.9) and by Lemma 1 we have that dP ∗/dni < 0 for i = A,B.
Therefore, equilibrium fraction of assets rescued after fire-sales (γ∗) is decreasing in ni for
i = A,B.
Since equilibrium fraction of assets sold in each country is given by 1−γ∗(ni, nj), we obtain
that this fraction is increasing in ni for i = A,B.
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions CONCAVITY, ELASTICITY and REGULARITY, each reg-
ulator’s best response is unique valued.
Proof. For this proof I refer to the conditions given by Assumptions CONCAVITY , ELAS-
TICITY and REGULARITY . I show that if the global investors’ return function, F (·) satisfies
these conditions, then the objective functions of independent regulators are concave. This also
tells us that first order conditions of the regulators problem, which also implicitly defines their
best response functions, is monotone and decreasing. Therefore, there is a unique solution to
these first order conditions or in other words best response of each regulator is unique valued.
Let’s reproduce regulators’ objective function here for convenience
max
Ni≥0
Wi(Ni, Nj) = max
Ni≥0
q(R− 1)Ni + (1− q)[Rγ∗(Ni, Nj)Ni −Ni] (A.3.12)
FOCs for regulator of country i’s problem will be given by
∂Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
= qR+ (1− q)R
{
∂γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
Ni + γ
∗(Ni, Nj)
}
− 1 (A.3.13)
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Let’s define the following function for convenience
vi(Ni, Nj) ≡ ∂γ
∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
Ni + γ
∗(Ni, Nj) (A.3.14)
Hence, we can write the FOCs simply as
∂Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
= qR+ (1− q)Rvi(Ni, Nj)− 1 (A.3.15)
We will show that Under Assumptions CONCAVITY , ELASTICITY and REGULARITY we
have vi1(Ni, Nj) < 0, hence the objective function is concave. This also means that the best
response functions are unique-valued. Note that in Lemma 1 we have obtained
dP ∗
dNi
=
c
P ∗D′(P ∗) + S(P ∗, Ni, Nj)
(A.3.16)
which is negative as we have shown there. Since D(P ∗) = S(P ∗, Ni, Nj) by the market clearing
condition, we can also express this derivative as
dP ∗
dNi
=
c
P ∗D′(P ∗) +D(P ∗)
(A.3.17)
We will use this expression in the derivative of γ∗ with respect to Ni below
∂γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
=
∂γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂P ∗
dP ∗
dNi
(A.3.18)
=
( c
P ∗
)2 1
D(P ∗) + P ∗D′(P ∗)
< 0
Hence we can obtain the second derivative as
∂2γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂N2i
= −
( c
P ∗
)2
G(P ∗)
dP ∗
dNi
(A.3.19)
where we define
G(P ∗) ≡ 2D(P
∗) + 4P ∗D′(P ∗) + P ∗2D′′(P ∗)
P ∗[D(P ∗) + P ∗D′(P ∗)]2
(A.3.20)
Note that the derivative of vi(·), which was defined by (A.3.14), with respect to the first
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argument is equal to
vi1(Ni, Nj) ≡
∂vi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
=
∂2γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂N2i
Ni + 2
∂γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
(A.3.21)
Put the findings above together to get this derivative as
vi1(·) = −
( c
P ∗
)2 [
G(P ∗)Ni − 2
c
]
dP ∗
dNi
(A.3.22)
again where G(P ∗) is as defined by (A.3.20) above.We will show that G(P ∗) is negative under
Assumptions CONCAVITY , ELASTICITY and REGULARITY , and hence vi1(·) < 0.
Note that using D(P ) ≡ F ′(P )−1 and P = F ′(y) we can obtain
(i) D(P ) = y, (ii) D′(P ) =
1
F ′′(y)
and (iii) D′′(P ) = − F
′′′(y)
F ′′(y)3
(A.3.23)
Hence, we can write the expression in the numerator of G(P ∗) as
2D(P ∗) + 4P ∗D′(P ∗) + P ∗2D′′(P ∗) = 2y∗ +
4F ′(y∗)
F ′′(y∗)
− F
′(y∗)2F ′′′(y∗)
F ′′(y∗)3
(A.3.24)
Re-arranging the RHS of (A.3.24), we obtain
2y∗F ′′(y∗)3 + 4F ′(y∗)F ′′(y∗)2 − F ′(y∗)2F ′′′(y∗)
F ′′(y∗)3
(A.3.25)
Note that the denominator of the last expression is negative by Assumption CONCAVITY.
Re-arrange the numerator to write it as
2F ′′(y∗)2
[
y∗F ′′(y∗) + F ′(y∗)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+) by ELASTICITY
− F ′(y∗)[F ′(y∗)F ′′′(y∗)− 2F ′′(y∗)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸ > 0
(−) by REGULARITY
(A.3.26)
The expression in (A.3.26) is positive under Assumption ELASTICITY and REGULARITY
as shown above. This implies that
2D(P ∗) + 4P ∗D′(P ∗) + P ∗2D′′(P ∗) < 0 (A.3.27)
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i.e. the numerator of G(P ∗) which was given by (A.3.24) is negative. Putting these results
together we obtain that vi1(Ni, Nj) < 0.
The analysis above shows that FOCs of each regulator is monotone and decreasing. Therefore,
we conclude that their best response functions are unique valued as desired.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions CONCAVITY, ELASTICITY and REGULARITY, op-
timal regulatory standards in the two countries are strategic substitutes.
Proof. Optimal regulatory standards in the two countries are strategic substitutes if and only
if the best response functions of regulators are downward slopping. We can apply the Implicit
Function Theorem (IFT) on the first order conditions to obtain the sign of the slope of best
response functions. This sign is shown to be equal to the sign of the cross derivative of the
objective function due to the results in Proposition 1. In order to show that the sign of the
cross derivative of the objective function is negative, I again refer to the technical conditions
given by Assumptions CONCAVITY , ELASTICITY and REGULARITY . I show that for
any (induced) demand function that satisfies Assumptions CONCAVITY to REGULARITY ,
this sign is negative and hence optimal investment levels are strategic substitutes.
If Ni and Nj are strategic substitutes we must have ∂
2Wi(Ni, Nj)/∂Ni∂Nj < 0. Remember
that
∂Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
= qR+ (1− q)Rvi(Ni, Nj)− 1 (A.3.28)
where
vi(Ni, Nj) ≡ ∂γ
∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
Ni + γ
∗(Ni, Nj) (A.3.29)
hence
∂2Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni∂Nj
= (1− q)R∂v
i(Ni, Nj)
∂Nj
(A.3.30)
= (1− q)R
{
∂2γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni∂Nj
Ni +
∂γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Nj
}
< 0
The sing of equation (A.3.30) is negative since
(i)
∂γ∗(Ni,Nj)
∂Nj
< 0 as shown by eq (A.3.18) and
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(ii) for the cross derivative of γ∗(Ni, Nj) we know that
∂2γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni∂Nj
=
∂2γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂N2i
(A.3.31)
since γ∗(Ni, Nj) is determined only by the sum of the two investment levels, not by their
individual values. Therefore we get an equation similar to the one obtained in the proof of
Lemma 3
vi2(·) ≡
∂vi(Ni, Nj)
∂Nj
= −
( c
P ∗
)2 [
G(P ∗)Ni − 1
c
]
dP ∗
dNi
(A.3.32)
which is negative under Assumptions 1 to 3 as shown in the proof of Lemma 3. Hence, the
best response functions are downward slopping which implies that Ni and Nj are strategic
substitutes.
Lemma 4. The best responses of each country satisfy 0 < N∗i <∞ for i = A,B if Assumption
RANGE holds, i.e. if 1 + c(1− q) < R ≤ 1/q.
Proof. Part 1 If R ≤ 1/q then N∗i <∞.
Let’s first define M = NA +NB such that
P ∗(M) = c (A.3.33)
Fix some Nj and consider two exhaustive cases:
Case 1 Nj < M.
Define
N i = M −Nj (A.3.34)
Consider regulators objective function as Ni → N i
lim
Ni→N i
Wi(Ni, Nj) = lim
Ni→N i
q(R− 1)Ni + (1− q)[Rγ∗(Ni, Nj)Ni −Ni] (A.3.35)
Now note that
lim
Ni→N i
γ∗(Ni, Nj) = lim
Ni→N i
(
1− c
P ∗(Ni, Nj)
)
= 0 (A.3.36)
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since lim
Ni,Nj→M
P ∗(Ni, Nj) = c by definition in (A.3.33). Therefore
lim
Ni→N i
Wi(Ni, Nj) = lim
Ni→N i
(qR− 1)Ni ≤ 0 (A.3.37)
since qR ≤ 1 by Assumption RANGE . Hence, it is never optimal to choose N∗i ≥ N i in this
case.
Case 2 Nj ≥M.
By definition of M this implies that P ∗(Ni, Nj) < c for any Ni > 0. In this case banks
optimally discard all capital at t = 1, i.e. χ∗ = 0 which implies that γ∗(Ni, Nj) = 0. Hence
social welfare in country i will be given by
Wi(Ni, Nj) = (qR− 1)Ni ≤ 0 (A.3.38)
since qR ≤ 1 by Assumption RANGE . Hence, N∗i = 0 in this case. Therefore we conclude
proof of Part 1 by showing that N∗i <∞ for i = A,B as long as qR ≤ 1.
Part 2 For the second part of the proof I will show that welfare in country i is always
decreasing in Ni when R < 1 + c(1 − q), and hence the best responses will be given by
N∗i = N
∗
j = 0. Remember
Wi(Ni, Nj) = q(R− 1)Ni + (1− q)[Rγ∗(Ni, Nj)Ni −Ni] (A.3.39)
Note that the highest value of γ∗(Ni, Nj) will be obtained as Ni, Nj → 0. Therefore
If Wi(0, 0) < 0 then Wi(Ni, Nj) < 0 for all Ni, Nj > 0 (A.3.40)
Consider first
lim
Ni,Nj→0
γ∗(Ni, Nj) = lim
Ni,Nj→0
(
1− c
P ∗(Ni, Nj)
)
= 1− c
R
(A.3.41)
since lim
Ni,Nj→0
P ∗(Ni, Nj) = R. Using this we can write
lim
Ni,Nj→0
Wi(Ni, Nj) =
{
q(R− 1) + (1− q)[R
(
1− c
R
)
− 1]
}
Ni (A.3.42)
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from which we can obtain lim
Ni,Nj→0
Wi(Ni, Nj) < 0 as long as
q(R− 1) + (1− q)[R
(
1− c
R
)
− 1] < 0 (A.3.43)
Re-arranging this inequality gives
qR+ (1− q)R+ (1− q)c− 1 < 0 (A.3.44)
where further simplification implies R < 1 + c(1− q).
Hence, we conclude that N∗i (Nj) = 0 for i = A,B as long as R < 1 + c(1− q).
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions CONCAVITY, ELASTICITY, REGULARITY and RANGE,
at least one pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists in the game between two financial regulator
at t = 0 . Moreover there exists at least one symmetric pure strategy NE.
Proof. For this proof, I make use of a theorem due to Debreu (1952) which states that “Sup-
pose that for each player the strategy space is compact and convex and the payoff function is
continuous and quasi-concave with respect to each player’s own strategy. Then there exists at
least one pure strategy NE in the game.”
I establish below that this game satisfies all three conditions stated in this theorem.
(i) Following Lemma 4 we can restrict strategy space for each regulator to [0,M ] which is
compact and convex.
(ii) Continuity of the objective function is obvious.
(iii) For concavity we evaluate the second derivative of the objective function with respect
to the own action:
∂2Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂N2i
= (1− q)R∂v
i(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
< 0 (A.3.45)
as shown by Lemma 3 above. Hence Nash Equilibria equilibria exist. Existence of a symmetric
Nash Equilibrium equilibrium is implied by the symmetry of the game.
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Proposition 3. Under Assumptions CONCAVITY, ELASTICITY, REGULARITY and RANGE,
there exists a unique symmetric NE of the game between the regulators at t = 0 .
Proof. I will make use of the theorem that states: “If the best response mapping is a contraction
on the entire strategy space, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium in the game.”
In two-player games best response functions are contraction everywhere if the absolute
value of their slopes are less than one everywhere. In order to show this, I make use of the nice
feature of equilibrium price function that it is determined only by the sum of the investment
levels in the two countries.
∣∣∣∣∂N∗i (Nj)∂Nj
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣−
∂2Wi(Ni,Nj)
∂Ni∂Nj
∂2Wi(Ni,Nj)
∂N2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 1 (A.3.46)
which can be equivalently stated as
∣∣∣∣∂2Wi(Ni, Nj)∂Ni∂Nj
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣∂2Wi(Ni, Nj)∂N2i
∣∣∣∣ (A.3.47)
Using the expressions for these derivatives given before this corresponds to
∣∣∣∣∂2γ∗(Ni, Nj)∂Ni∂Nj Ni + ∂γ
∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Nj
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣∂2γ∗(Ni, Nj)∂N2i Ni + 2∂γ
∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
∣∣∣∣ (A.3.48)
Note that derivative on the right hand side is negative by Lemma 3 and the derivative on
the left hand side is negative by Proposition 1. Moreover, γ∗(Ni, Nj) and its derivatives are
determined only by the sum of the two investment levels, not by their individual values. This
implies that
∂2γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Nj∂Ni
=
∂2γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂N2i
and
∂γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Nj
=
∂γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
(A.3.49)
which implies that |LHS| < |RHS| in (A.3.48) and hence the slope of best response functions
is less than one everywhere on the domain.
Proposition 4. Non-cooperative symmetric equilibrium investment levels are increasing in q
and R.
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Proof. Using Cramer’s rule on FOCs we get
∂N̂i
∂α
= −
∂2Wi
∂Ni∂α
∂2Wj
∂N2j
− ∂2Wi∂Ni∂Nj
∂2Wj
∂Nj∂α
∂2Wi
∂N2i
∂2Wj
∂N2j
− ∂2Wi∂Ni∂Nj
∂2Wj
∂Nj∂Ni
(A.3.50)
where α ∈ {q,R, c} is a parameter of the model. First note that
∂2Wi
∂N2i
< 0, and
∂2Wj
∂Nj∂Ni
< 0 for i = A,B (A.3.51)
by Lemma 3 and Proposition 1. Moreover in the proof of Proposition 3 we have shown that
∣∣∣∣∂2Wi(Ni, Nj)∂Ni∂Nj
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣∂2Wi(Ni, Nj)∂N2i
∣∣∣∣ (A.3.52)
which implies that the sign of the denominator above is positive. Moreover, in a symmetric
equilibrium we will have
∂2Wi
∂Ni∂α
=
∂2Wj
∂Nj∂α
and
∂2Wj
∂N2j
=
∂2Wi
∂N2i
(A.3.53)
which allows us to write the derivative as
∂N̂i
∂α
= −
∂2Wi
∂Ni∂α
(−)︷ ︸︸ ︷[
∂2Wi
∂N2i
− ∂
2Wi
∂Ni∂Nj
]
∂2Wi
∂N2i
∂2Wj
∂N2j
− ∂
2Wi
∂Ni∂Nj
∂2Wj
∂Nj∂Ni︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
(A.3.54)
the term inside the brackets in the numerator is again negative by the inequality (A.3.52).
Therefore the sing of the derivative above will be equal to the sign of ∂2Wi/∂Ni∂α. To obtain
this sign consider the FOCs of regulators’ problem
∂Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
= qR+ (1− q)Rvi(Ni, Nj)− 1 (A.3.55)
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which will imply that in equilibrium
vi(N̂i, N̂j) =
1− qR
(1− q)R (A.3.56)
Therefore we can obtain that
∂Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni∂R
= q + (1− q)vi(Ni, Nj) (A.3.57)
= q +
1− qR
R
=
1
R
> 0
in equilibrium, using equation (A.3.15). Hence we conclude that ∂N̂i/∂R > 0.
For comparative statics with respect to q consider
∂Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni∂q
= R−Rvi(Ni, Nj) (A.3.58)
which in equilibrium, using equation (A.3.15) we can write as
∂Wi(N̂i, N̂j)
∂Ni∂q
= R
[
1− 1− qR
(1− q)R
]
(A.3.59)
=
R− 1
1− q > 0 (A.3.60)
hence we can also conclude that
∂N̂i
∂q
> 0 for i = A,B
i.e. equilibrium investment levels in both countries are increasing as the probability of good
state rises.
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions CONCAVITY, ELASTICITY, REGULARITY and RANGE,
equilibrium price of assets satisfy P ∗ > c.
Proof. By Proposition 4 we have established that equilibrium investment levels are increasing
in both q andR. Since Assumption RANGE restricts qR ≤ 1, for a given set of other parameters
we will obtain the highest investment in equilibrium if qR = 1. Consider the FOCs of regulators’
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problem evaluated at equilibrium regulation standards for qR = 1
∂Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
= qR+ (1− q)R
{
∂γ∗(N̂i, N̂j)
∂Ni
N̂i + γ
∗(N̂i, N̂j)
}
− 1 = 0
= (R− 1)
{
∂γ∗(N̂i, N̂j)
∂Ni
N̂i + γ
∗(N̂i, N̂j)
}
= 0
which implies that
∂γ∗(N̂i, N̂j)
∂Ni
N̂i + γ
∗(N̂i, N̂j) = 0
Lemma 3 has shown that
∂γ∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
< 0
Therefore for the FOCs above to hold we need
γ∗(N̂i, N̂j) = 1− c
P ∗(N̂i, N̂j)
> 0 (A.3.61)
which implies that P ∗(N̂i, N̂j) > c as needed.
Proposition 5. N˜ < N̂, i.e. independent national regulators choose a higher investment in
equilibrium compared to the cooperative benchmark.
Proof. For this proof I use the alternative formulation of central regulator’s problem which I
reproduce here for convenience
max
N≥0
W (N) = q(R− 1)N + (1− q)[Rγ˜∗(N)N −N ] (A.3.62)
The FOCs for this problem will be given by
∂W (·)
∂N
∣∣∣∣
N
= qR+ (1− q)Rv˜(N)− 1 = 0 (A.3.63)
where N is the optimal total investment level in the two countries. Rearranging the FOCs
gives that
v˜(N) ≡ γ˜∗′(N)N + γ˜∗(N) = 1− qR
(1− q)R (A.3.64)
where v˜(·) is similar to the function vi(Ni, Nj) except that it is defined over the total investment
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level in the two countries. The same is true for the function γ˜∗(·). Now using the fact that
globally optimal investment level in each country will satisfy N˜ = N/2 we can write
v˜(N) = v˜(2N˜) = γ′(2N˜)(2N˜) + γ(2N˜) (A.3.65)
Note that equilibrium fraction of rescued assets, γ˜∗(·) , is determined by the sum of the
investment levels in the two countries. In other words, exact division of global investment
between the two countries do not affect γ˜∗(·) and hence its derivatives. This property allows
us to write v˜(N) as (with a slight abuse of notation)
v˜(N) = v˜(2N˜) = γ˜∗′(2N˜)(2N˜) + γ˜∗(2N˜)
= 2γ∗1(N˜ , N˜)N˜ + γ
∗(N˜ , N˜)
= v(N˜ , N˜) + γ∗1(N˜ , N˜)N˜ (A.3.66)
On the other hand, remember that each independent regulator’s FOCs will give us
∂Wi(·)
∂Ni
∣∣∣∣
(N̂i,N̂j)
= qR+ (1− q)Rvi(N̂i, N̂j)− 1 = 0 (A.3.67)
from which we get that in equilibrium
vi(N̂i, N̂j) =
1− qR
(1− q)R (A.3.68)
Comparing (A.3.68) and (A.3.64) we see that v˜(N) = vi(N̂ , N̂) where (N̂ , N̂) are the
symmetric Nash equilibrium investment levels. Using this together with equality (A.3.66) we
can write
v(N˜ , N˜) = v˜(N)− γ1(N˜ , N˜)N˜
= vi(N̂ , N̂)− γ1(N˜ , N˜)N˜ (A.3.69)
we have previously shown that γ′(Ni, Nj) < 0 which implies that v(N˜ , N˜) > v(N̂ , N̂). Lemma
3 has shown that vi(Ni, Nj) is decreasing in Ni, and Proposition 1 has shown that v
i(Ni, Nj)
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is decreasing in Nj . Since v
i(Ni, Nj) is decreasing in both arguments, we can conclude that
N˜ < N̂.
Proposition 6. If the countries are symmetric then both regulators prefer to deliver their
authority to a central systemic risk regulator, i.e. Wi(N˜i, N˜j) ≥Wi(N̂i, N̂j) holds for i = A,B.
Proof. First, let’s define W˜i ≡ Wi(N˜i, N˜j) as the welfare of country i = A,B under central
regulation and Ŵi ≡ Wi(N̂i, N̂j) as the welfare of country i = A,B under the symmetric
non-cooperative equilibrium. Note that by symmetry we have
W˜A = W˜B and ŴA = ŴB
Since central regulation levels, (N˜A, N˜B), maximize the total welfare of the two countries,
WA +WB, by definition we know that
W˜A + W˜B ≥ ŴA + ŴB
which implies that W˜i ≥ Ŵi for i = A,B.
A.3.2 Proofs for the Asymmetric Countries Case
Proposition 7. If RA > RB, then N̂A > N̂B in non-cooperative equilibrium.
Proof. Remember the FOCs of regulator’s problem
∂Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
= qR+ (1− q)Rvi(Ni, Nj)− 1 (A.3.70)
which will imply that in equilibrium we have
vi(Ni, Nj) =
1− qRi
(1− q)Ri ≡ βi (A.3.71)
Note that βi is decreasing in R. Since RA > RB by assumption, we will have that βA < βB.
Remember that by vi(Ni, Nj) is defined as
vi(Ni, Nj) ≡ ∂γ
∗(Ni, Nj)
∂Ni
Ni + γ
∗(Ni, Nj) (A.3.72)
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βA < βB implies that v
A(N̂A, N̂B) < v
B(N̂B, N̂A). Using the expression above this is
equivalent to
∂γ∗(NA, NB)
∂NA
∣∣∣∣
N̂A,N̂B
N̂A + γ
∗(N̂A, N̂B) <
∂γ∗(NB, NA)
∂NB
∣∣∣∣
N̂B ,N̂A
N̂B + γ
∗(N̂B, N̂A) (A.3.73)
Since γ∗(), and its derivatives determined only by the sum of the regulation levels, we will
have
γ∗(N̂A, N̂B) = γ∗(N̂B, N̂A) (A.3.74)
and
∂γ∗(NA, NB)
∂NA
∣∣∣∣
N̂A,N̂B
=
∂γ∗(NB, NA)
∂NB
∣∣∣∣
N̂B ,N̂A
(A.3.75)
Using these two equalities in (A.3.73) gives
∂γ∗(NA, NB)
∂NA
∣∣∣∣
N̂A,N̂B
(
N̂A − N̂B
)
< 0 (A.3.76)
From Lemma 3 we know that
∂γ∗(NA, NB)
∂NA
∣∣∣∣
N̂A,N̂B
< 0 (A.3.77)
Therefore, for inequality (A.3.76) to be true we need to have N̂A − N̂B > 0, or equivalently
N̂A > N̂B.
Proposition 8. There exists no central regulation level N > min{N̂A, N̂B}.
Proof. By Envelope Theorem we will have that
dWi(N
∗
i (Nj), Nj)
dNj
=
∂Wi(Ni, Nj)
∂Nj
∣∣∣∣
Ni=N∗i (Nj)
< 0 (A.3.78)
By assumption we have N̂A > N̂B. Consider a central regulation N = N̂B. From above we
get that WB(N̂B, N̂B) > WB(N̂B, N̂A). However, by definition WA(N̂B, N̂B) < WA(N̂A, N̂B),
i.e. a central regulation with N = N̂B is rejected by Regulator A. Now consider N > N̂B. By
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Envelope Theorem we have that
WA(N
∗
A(N), N) < WA(N̂A, N̂B) (A.3.79)
Moreover, by definition
WA(N,N) < WA(N
∗
A(N), N) (A.3.80)
Hence, any common regulation such that N > N̂B will also be rejected by regulator A.
Lemma 6. For any common regulation level N such that WA(N,N) > WA(N̂A, N̂B) we have
WB(N,N) > WB(N̂B, N̂A).
Proof. Suppose that WA(N,N) > WA(N̂A, N̂B) for some N . From Proposition 8 we know
that such N must satisfy N < NB. Note that we can obtain
WA(N̂A, N̂B) > WA(N
∗
A(N̂A), N̂A) > WA(N̂B, N̂A) (A.3.81)
where the first inequality is follows from Envelope Theorem given by (A.3.79), and the second
is by definition of optimality. Remember that
Wi(Ni, Nj) = qRiNi + (1− q)Riγ∗(Ni, Nj)Ni −Ni (A.3.82)
Hence, WA(N,N)−WA(N̂B, N̂A) will be given by
qRA[N − N̂B] + (1− q)RA[γ∗(N,N)N − γ∗(N̂B, N̂A)N̂B]− [N − N̂B] > 0 (A.3.83)
Which we can re-arrange and write as
(1− qRA)[N̂B −N ] + (1− q)RA[γ∗(N,N)N − γ∗(N̂B, N̂A)N̂B] (A.3.84)
Now consider WB(N,N)−WB(N̂B, N̂A) which will be equal to
(1− qRB)[N̂B −N ] + (1− q)RB[γ∗(N,N)N − γ∗(N̂B, N̂A)N̂B] (A.3.85)
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Now, let’s compare (A.3.84) and (A.3.85). First note that the first terms are positive in both
of them. N̂B − N > 0 as argued above and it receives a higher weight in (A.3.85) since
1− qRB > 1− qRA due to our assumption that RA > RB. Now, if the second terms are also
positive, (A.3.85) will be positive and we are done. However, if second terms are negative, we
know that this second term receives a higher weight in (A.3.84). Hence, if (A.3.84) is positive
in spite of this higher weight on the negative term, (A.3.85) will necessarily be positive, since
it carries a lower weight on the negative term.
Proposition 9. Suppose that F ′(0) = 1. Let s ≡ RA−RB > 0. Then for any RA, there exists
ŝ ∈ (0, RA − 1) such that WA(Nm, Nm) −WA(N̂A, N̂B) ≥ 0 if s ≤ ŝ, and WA(Nm, Nm) −
WA(N̂A, N̂B) < 0 otherwise.
Proof. Let’s see how this difference changes with s
d[WA(N
m, Nm)−WA(N̂A, N̂B)]
ds
(A.3.86)
this derivative will be given by
WA1
∂Nm
∂s
+WA2
∂Nm
∂s
+
∂WA
∂s
∣∣∣∣
Nm,Nm
−WA1dN̂A
ds
−WA2dN̂B
ds
− ∂WA
∂s
∣∣∣∣
N̂A,N̂B
(A.3.87)
Applying envelope theorem reduces this to
∂WA
∂s
∣∣∣∣
Nm,Nm
−WA2dN̂B
ds
− ∂WA
∂s
∣∣∣∣
N̂A,N̂B
(A.3.88)
Now note that since
WA(NA, NB) = q(RA − 1)NA + (1− q)[RAγ∗(NA, NB)NA −NA] (A.3.89)
we will have that
∂WA
∂s
∣∣∣∣
Nm,Nm
= 0 and
∂WA
∂s
∣∣∣∣
N̂A,N̂B
= 0 (A.3.90)
Therefore
d[WA(N
m, Nm)−WA(N̂A, N̂B)]
ds
= −WA2dN̂B
ds
(A.3.91)
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First note that
WA2 ≡ ∂WA(N,N)
∂NB
= (1− q)R∂γ
∗(NA, NB)
∂NB
NA < 0 (A.3.92)
Moreover, by Proposition 4 we have shown that N̂i is decreasing in R for i = A,B. This will
imply that as s increases (or R2 decreases), regulator 2 will choose a lower N̂B in equilibrium,
i.e. dN̂B/ds < 0.Therefore,
d[WA(N
m, Nm)−WA(N̂A, N̂B)]
ds
= −WA2dN̂B
ds
< 0 (A.3.93)
Hence, the benefit from cooperating is decreasing in the difference between the two countries.
Therefore if WA(N
m, Nm)−WA(N̂A, N̂B) = 0 for some ŝ it will be negative for s ≥ ŝ.
We will show that such an ŝ exists. It is clear that for s = 0 we have WA(N
m, Nm) −
WA(N̂A, N̂B) > 0. On the other hand, as RB → 1 + c(1 − q), we can argue that N̂B will
necessarily become zero. From Proposition 11 we know that for central regulation be acceptable
by regulator 1, we must haveNm < N̂B. However, as N̂B → 0, it won’t be possible to reduce N̂B
sufficiently to compensate regulator 1. Therefore, we will have WA(N
m, Nm)−WA(N̂A, N̂B) <
0 for sufficiently large s. By continuity an ŝ such that WA(N
m, Nm)−WA(N̂A, N̂B) = 0 must
exist.
A.3.3 Proof of the Systemic Failure Exercise
Proposition 10. Let F (y) = R ln(1 + y). If 1 + c < R < R̂ then there exists a q̂ ∈ (0, 1/R)
such that for all q ≥ q̂ we have that N̂(q) ≥ N c.In other words, if the probability of the good
state is higher than q̂, banks fail in the bad state in non-competitive equilibrium. If R ≤ 1 + c
then banks always fail in the bad state, and if R ≥ R̂ then banks never fail in the bad state
where R̂ is given by
R̂ ≡ 1
2
(
2 + c+
√
c
√
8 + c
)
(A.3.94)
Proof. By Proposition 4 we have already shown that equilibrium investment level is increasing
in q and R. Fix some R. Note that, if N̂(R, 1/R, c) < N c, then N̂(R, q, c) < N̂ c for all
q ∈ [0, 1/R] since N̂ is increasing in q.
I will first show that when q = 1/R, the difference N c − N̂ is monotonically increasing in
104
R. Moreover, it is negative when R is small and positive for sufficiently high R. Therefore, we
will establish using Intermediate Value Theorem that there exists some R̂ such that N c(R̂, c)−
N̂(R̂, 1/R̂, c) = 0. Using definitions of N c and N̂ we can write this difference as
N c − N̂ = aR
2c
(
R− 1− c
R− 1
)
−
a
(
4R− cσ −√8cσR+ (cσ)2)
8c
(A.3.95)
where
σ =
(1− q)R
R− 1
as defined before. Evaluating this difference at q = 1/R gives that
N c − N̂ = aR
2c
(
R− 1− c
R− 1
)
−
a
(
4R− c−√8cR+ c2
)
8c
(A.3.96)
We can determine the behavior of this difference as R changes by looking at the derivative
with respect to R which will be given by
∂
(
N c − N̂
)
∂R
=
aR
2c
(
(R− 1)2 + c
(R− 1)2 − 1 +
√
8cR+ c2
c
)
> 0 (A.3.97)
This derivative is clearly positive, which means that the difference is monotonically increasing
in R. Moreover, note that given q = 1/R
lim
R→1+c
{
N c(R, c)− N̂(R, q, c)
}
< 0 (A.3.98)
This follows since N c(R, c)→ 0 as R→ 1 + c, which can be clearly seen from the definition of
N c(R, c). We know that N̂(R, q, c) > 0 as R→ 1+c since by Proposition 3 we have established
that equilibrium investment levels are positive as long as R > 1 + c(1 − q). To complete the
argument, I will show that when q = 1/R
lim
R→∞
{
N c(R, c)− N̂(R, q, c)
}
> 0 (A.3.99)
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In order to see this we can expand the difference N c − N̂ given by (A.3.96) to write it as
N c − N̂ = aR2c
(
−c
R−1 − c4 +
√
8cR+c2
4
)
(A.3.100)
Now, note that as R becomes large the first term inside the parenthesis goes to zero whereas
the last term goes to infinity. Therefore this difference is definitely positive for large R. Now,
using the Intermediate Value Theorem we can conclude that there exists some R̂ > 1 + c such
that N̂(R̂, 1/R̂, c) = N c(R̂, c). Using the definitions of N̂ , and N c from equations (1.22) and
(1.22) respectively we can solve for R̂ as follows
R̂ =
1
2
(
2 + c+
√
c
√
8 + c
)
(A.3.101)
Case 1 R ≥ R̂
The analysis above implies that for R ≥ R̂ we have that N̂(R, 1/R, c) ≤ N c(R, c)˙.Moreover,
since for any given R, the highest value of N̂ is obtained when q = 1/R, we will also have that
for R ≥ R̂ we have N̂(R, q, c) ≤ N c(R, c) for all q ∈ [0, 1/R]. In other words, if R ≥ R̂, banks
never fail in the bad state for any value of q ∈ [0, 1/R].
Case 2 1 + c < R < R̂.
In this case we can show that
lim
q→0
N̂(R, q, c) < N c < lim
q→1/R
N̂(R, q, c) (A.3.102)
Hence by the Intermediate Value Theorem we will conclude that there exists q̂ ∈ (0, 1/R) such
that N̂(q̂) = N c. Therefore, banks will fail in the bad state if q ≥ q̂, and they will survive
otherwise. First, I will consider the first part of the inequality in (A.3.102). It will be useful
to note that
lim
q→0
σ =
R
R− 1 and limq→1/Rσ = 1 (A.3.103)
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Therefore let’s consider N̂ when q = 0 and check whether it is less than N c
a
(
4R− cRR−1 −
√
8Rc RR−1 +
(
R
R−1
)2)
8c
<?
aR
2c
(
R− 1− c
R− 1
)
(A.3.104)
where left hand side of the inequality is N̂ evaluated when q = 0, and right hand side is N c
given by (1.22). Simplifying both sides reduces this comparison to
4aR− acR
R− 1 − a
√
8Rc
R
R− 1 +
(
R
R− 1
)2
<? 4aR− 4acR
R− 1 (A.3.105)
simplifying further yields
c
R− 1 <
? 1 (A.3.106)
which is true as long as 1 + c < R as we proposed for this case.
For the second part of the inequality (A.3.102) consider N̂ when q = 1/R and check when
it is greater than N c
a
(
4R− c−√8Rc+ c2
)
8c
>?
aR
2c
(
R− 1− c
R− 1
)
(A.3.107)
where the left hand side of the inequality is N̂ evaluated when q = 1/R, and right hand side
is N c given by (1.22). Simplifying reduces this comparison to
4aR− ac − a
√
8Rc+ c2 >? 4aR− 4acR
R− 1 (A.3.108)
Solving for R yields that this inequality is true as long as
R <
1
2
(
2 + c+
√
c
√
8 + c
) ≡ R̂ (A.3.109)
Therefore we can conclude that if 1+c < R < R̂ ,there exists q̂ ∈ (0, 1/R) such that N̂(q) > N c
for q ≥ q̂ . In words, when 1 + c < R < R̂ banks fail systemically in the bad state if q ≥ q̂ (R),
and they survive if q < q̂ (R).
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Case 3 1 + c(1− q) < R ≤ 1 + c
We know that when 1 + c(1− q) < R ≤ 1 + c we will have N c(R, c) = 0 by definition and
N̂(R, q, c) > 0 from Proposition 3. Therefore, we will have that N̂(R, q, c) ≥ N c whenever
1 + c(1 − q) < R ≤ 1 + c for all q ∈ [0, 1/R]. Therefore banks always fail in the bad state in
this case.
Lemma 7. For any given R < R̂, there exists some q˜ > q̂, where q̂ is as defined in Propo-
sition 10, such that if q ∈ (q̂, q˜] moving to a central common regulation from the symmetric
uncoordinated equilibrium will eliminate the systemic failure in the bad state.
Proof. We know that systemic crises happen when initial investment levels are high. If initial
investment levels are close to the critical borders beyond which systemic crises occur, i.e. N̂(·)
is slightly above N c(·), then moving to global regulation can reduce investment levels in both
countries to N˜ < N c, and eliminate systemic failures in the bad state.
We can follow the similar lines in the proof of Proposition 10, and show that if 1+c < R < R˜
then there exists a q˜ ∈ (0, 1/R) such that for all q ≥ q˜ we have that N˜(q) ≥ N c. In other
words, for such R, if the probability of the good state is higher than q˜, banks fail in the bad
state under common central regulation. If R ≤ 1 + c then banks always fail in the bad state,
and if R ≥ R˜ then banks never fail in the bad state where
R˜ ≡ 1
2
(
2 + c+
√
c
√
4 + c
)
(A.3.110)
It is clear that R˜ < R̂ ≡ (1/2) (2 + c+√c√8 + c). We can also show that 1/R > q˜ > q̂
which will complete the proof.
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Appendix B
Graphs and Tables for Chapter 2
Figure B.1: Distribution of the Capital Stringency Index for Each Survey
Figure B.2: Distribution of the Change in the Capital Stringency Index
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Figure B.3: Average Capital Stringency and World Business Cycle Trend
Figure B.4: Average Stringency of Bank Capital Regulations
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Table B.1: Countries by Income Group and Development Level
Advanced Emerging
High
Income
Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United States
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hong Kong, China, Hun-
gary, Israel, Korea, Rep., Kuwait,
Oman, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Ara-
bia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Taiwan, United Arab Emirates
Upper
Middle
Income
Argentina, Belarus, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Chile, China, Colombia, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Jor-
dan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon,
Lihtuania, Macedonia, Malaysia,
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Romania,
Russia, Serbia, South Africa, Thai-
land, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay,
Venezuela
Middle
Income
Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, El Salvador,
Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mo-
rocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine
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Table B.2: Panel Data Summary
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
capital stringency overall 3.72 1.61 0 6 N = 280
between 1.01 1 6 n = 83
within 1.28 0.72 7.72 T-bar = 3.37
gdp growth overall 3.45 3.08 -5.36 19.86 N = 275
between 1.98 -0.25 11.37 n = 82
within 2.56 -5.28 15.67 T-bar = 3.35
government banks overall 16.98 20.53 0 80 N = 253
between 18.72 0 75.74 n = 82
within 9.08 -21.05 54.85 T-bar = 3.09
concentration ratio overall 58.73 18.46 15.32 100.00 N = 274
between 16.27 19.16 96.53 n = 82
within 7.77 31.52 93.98 T-bar = 3.34
legal origin uk overall 0.25 0.44 0 1 N = 279
between 0.43 0 1 n = 82
within 0.00 0.25 0.25 T-bar = 3.40
legal origin fr overall 0.45 0.50 0 1 N = 279
between 0.50 0 1 n = 82
within 0.00 0.45 0.45 T-bar = 3.40
legal origin ge overall 0.23 0.42 0 1 N = 279
between 0.42 0 1 n = 82
within 0 0.23 0.23 T-bar = 3.40
112
Table B.3: Pairwise Correlations Between Variables
cs growth gbank con emg inc louk lofr loge
cs 1.00
growth -0.17 1.00
(0.00)
gbank -0.10 0.13 1.00
(0.10) (0.04)
con -0.03 0.08 -0.10 1.00
(0.60) (0.18) (0.10)
emg -0.11 0.26 0.26 0.04 1.00
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50)
inc -0.07 0.15 0.34 -0.20 0.56 1.00
(0.22) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
louk 0.05 0.01 -0.08 -0.11 -0.04 -0.01 1.00
(0.41) (0.82) (0.19) (0.08) (0.47) (0.81)
lofr -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.17 0.35 -0.53 1.00
(0.84) (0.78) (0.24) (0.44) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
loge -0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.27 -0.32 -0.50 1.00
(0.40) (0.49) (0.33) (0.45) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1 p values in parentheses.
2 cs is the levels of the capital stringency index. The index takes disrete values between 0 and 6.
3 growth is 3 year average growth rate for years t, t− 1 and t− 2 whereas the capital stringency
index represents the state of the capital regulation the end of year t.
4 gbank is the percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more government
owned.
4 con is the two year average (t, t− 1) of three bank concentration ratio for each country.
4 emg is a dummy that is equal to 1 for emerging countries, and to 0 for advanced countries.
4 inc is equal to 1 if the country is in ‘high income’ group, 2 if in ‘upper-middle income’ group,
and 3 if in ‘middle income’ group.
4 louk, lofr, loge are dummy variables that take a value equal to 1 if the legal origin of the country
is based on the United Kingdom, France and Germany respectively.
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Table B.4: Logit Regressions for Individual Index Questions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES baselweight creditrisk marketrisk dloanloss dlosssecury dlossfx
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.9.1) (3.9.2) (3.9.3)
Fixed Effects
GDP growth -0.494 -0.208*** -0.228*** -0.102* -0.031 -0.048
(0.440) (0.002) (0.001) (0.100) (0.559) (0.372)
Concentration -0.032 -0.007 -0.025 -0.038* -0.042* -0.051**
(0.453) (0.755) (0.314) (0.065) (0.069) (0.012)
Govt. banks -0.095 -0.042** -0.041* -0.036* -0.020 -0.023
(0.783) (0.041) (0.056) (0.058) (0.233) (0.164)
Observations 12 176 165 155 148 164
Number of code 3 51 48 44 43 48
Pop. Average
GDP growth -0.312** -0.178*** -0.189*** -0.084* -0.037 -0.037
(0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.098) (0.459) (0.459)
Concentration 0.034 -0.007 -0.012 -0.001 -0.001 -0.014
(0.408) (0.415) (0.121) (0.886) (0.892) (0.103)
Govt. banks 0.057 -0.012* -0.010 -0.007 -0.013 -0.009
(0.229) (0.100) (0.173) (0.414) (0.175) (0.279)
Constant 3.500** 0.903 1.226** 0.832 1.264** 1.858***
(0.028) (0.107) (0.024) (0.193) (0.027) (0.002)
Observations 246 246 246 246 246 246
Number of code 81 81 81 81 81 81
Pooled Logit
GDP growth -0.315** -0.173*** -0.182*** -0.075 -0.035 -0.031
(0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.136) (0.486) (0.525)
Concentration 0.033 -0.007 -0.012 0.005 0.004 -0.011
(0.429) (0.393) (0.108) (0.594) (0.655) (0.176)
Govt. banks 0.058 -0.010 -0.007 -0.001 -0.010 -0.007
(0.239) (0.151) (0.298) (0.911) (0.305) (0.411)
Constant 3.550** 0.860 1.158** 0.344 0.920* 1.620***
(0.032) (0.105) (0.026) (0.550) (0.094) (0.004)
Observations 246 246 246 246 246 246
1 The dependent variables are individual questions that make up the capital stringency index. See Table 2.1
for question definitions.
2 GDP growth, government-owned banks and concentration ratio are expressed in percentages. For example,
three percent real GDP growth rate is expressed as 3.0 in our data.
3 p values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.5: Fixed Effects Estimation with Interaction Terms
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP growth -0.125*** -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.124***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Government-owned banks -0.036*** -0.028** -0.035*** -0.027**
(0.002) (0.031) (0.003) (0.036)
Concentration ratio -0.029** -0.032** -0.036** -0.038**
(0.023) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012)
adv*GDP growth -0.137 -0.186
(0.236) (0.121)
adv*Government-owned banks -0.030 -0.038
(0.271) (0.165)
adv*Concentration ratio 0.016 0.031
(0.556) (0.275)
Constant 6.648*** 6.700*** 6.733*** 6.587***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 246 246 246 246
R-squared 0.177 0.176 0.172 0.191
Number of code 81 81 81 81
Calculated Slopes for Advanced Countries
GDP growth (adv=1) -0.262** -0.310***
(0.016) (0.006)
Government-owned banks (adv=1) -0.058** -0.065***
(0.015) (0.007)
Concentration ratio (adv=1) -0.020 -0.006
(0.400) (0.794)
1 The dependent variable is the standardized value of the capital stringency index. The range of
the standardized index is [−2.25, 1.22].
2 adv is a dummy that is equal to 1 for advanced countries, and 0 for emerging countries.
3 The slopes for advanced countries in the last three rows calculated by adding the corresponding
coefficient in the first three rows and the interaction term in the next three rows.
4 GDP growth, government-owned banks and concentration ratio are expressed in percentages. For
example, three percent real GDP growth rate is expressed as 3.0 in our data.
5 GDP growth is 3 year average growth rate for years t, t−1 and t−2 whereas the capital stringency
index represents the state of the capital regulation the end of year t.
6 p values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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